الاتحاد الأوروبي لتبادل الانبعاثات ، نظام فشلها - في - ث - - المحاولة الثالثة

القضايا الجديدة من موسام الجديدة، وهي مجلة نشرتها جماعة العدالة المناخ الهند تهدف إلى تسهيل النقاش البناء والإبداعي بشأن قضايا المناخ، وربطها بالصراعات المحلية على ريسو الطبيعية. التقرير الكامل ويمكن تحميلها من هنا. أبستراكت تسود مناقشات المناخ والبيئة العدالة قبل مؤتمر الأمم المتحدة المعني بتغير المناخ، COP21، المقرر عقده في كانون الأول / ديسمبر هذا العام. وكان وضع أسعار على النظم الإيكولوجية منذ عدة عقود، على الرغم من أنها كانت خاصة خلال المفاوضات المناخية للأمم المتحدة مع إدخال سوق الكربون، وهو النظام الذي يضع مو. برويكتشيوكوتن y جدل ديل دوكومنتال: كوتوكسيك أمازون: مقتل زياكيوت كلاوديو إي مارياكوت (الإنجليزية) ديرتشيواكوتن ديل إيفنتو: مركز سياكوتيفيك دير سانت أغوستياكيوت، سالا نوبل، كارر كوميرسديل، 36، كب. 08003 برشلونة (برشلونة) فيشا: مياكوتيركول. 24 أبريل 2013 لندن، المملكة المتحدة في يوليو 2012، أكدت دراكس أنها تخطط لتحويل نصف قدرتها على حرق الكتلة الحيوية ونداش وهذا سيجعل دراكس أكبر محطة للكتلة الحيوية في العالم. وإذا استمر ذلك، فإن دراكس ستحرق حبيبات مصنوعة من 15.8 مليون طن. ويغير الاتحاد الأوروبي قواعده بشأن كيفية تداول الكربون استجابة لسلسلة من حالات الغش والأزمة المالية. يبحث هذا التقرير كيف تحاول جماعات الضغط التأثير على هذه العملية، وتلاحظ أن مثل هذا القياس. وفي اليوم العالمي لمزارع الأشجار المتعددة الأحراج، يسعى برنامج "لا ريد"، وهو ائتلاف من جماعات العدالة المناخية ومنظمات الشعوب الأصلية، إلى دعم الرسالة المرفقة. مع هذه الرسالة ونحن نهدف إلى أ. لاس بولياوتيتيكاس ديل كامبيو كليماكوتيتيكو كومو هيرامينتاس بارا لا ليغاليزاسيواكوتن ديل ديسبوجو، إل كونترول ريجيونال y لا إمبوسيسيواكوتن دي ميغابرويكتوس أغرويندوستراليس سيغواكوتن لا كانتيداد دي هكتاكوتيريس s. جعلت يوروبيرسكوس أكبر الملوثين المليارات من النظام الأوروبي لتجارة الانبعاثات (إتس). لكن الإحاطة الإعلامية الجديدة الصادرة عن منظمة رصد التجارة الكربونية تقول أن هذا المخطط سيضمن أن الصناعة لن تضطر إلى خفض انبعاثاتها حتى على الأقل. وقد صوت البرلمان الأوروبي ضد مقترحات لدعم خطة عالمية رائدة لتجارة الكربون، تهدف إلى خفض انبعاثات ثاني أكسيد الكربون. وانخفض السعر الذي ينبعث منه إلى أدنى مستوى قياسي، مما رفع q. لسنوات وضعنا إيماننا في السوق لتحفيز التكنولوجيا الأنظف، ولسنوات سوق الكربون مليئة بالفساد. وقتها لمحاولة شيء آخر الكربون مار. يدعو الاتحاد الأوروبي إلى إلغاء إتس. دعا ويندل الثلاثي و برناديت سيغول الأسبوع الماضي لدعم لدكوباكلودلوردركو والإصلاح الهيكلي اللاحق لل إميس الفاشلة. سياسة الاتحاد الأوروبي الحد من الكربون الرئيسي قد تعرضت لإطلاق النار من حملة الحملات الذين يدعون أنه في الواقع يزيد من الانبعاثات ويجبر الناس العاديين لتحمل التكاليف في حين أن الملوثين تجعل. اليوم سوق الأسهم أخبار أمب تحليل في الوقت الحقيقي بعد ساعات ما قبل السوق أخبار فلاش اقتباس ملخص اقتباس الرسوم البيانية التفاعلية الإعداد الافتراضي يرجى ملاحظة أنه بمجرد إجراء اختيارك، فإنه سيتم تطبيق على جميع الزيارات المستقبلية لناسداك. إذا كنت مهتما في أي وقت بالعودة إلى الإعدادات الافتراضية، يرجى تحديد الإعداد الافتراضي أعلاه. إذا كان لديك أي أسئلة أو واجهت أي مشاكل في تغيير الإعدادات الافتراضية الخاصة بك، يرجى البريد الإلكتروني إسفيدباكناسداك. الرجاء تأكيد اختيارك: لقد اخترت تغيير الإعداد الافتراضي الخاص بك للبحث اقتباس. ستصبح الآن الصفحة المستهدفة الافتراضية ما لم تغير التهيئة مرة أخرى، أو تحذف ملفات تعريف الارتباط. هل أنت متأكد من رغبتك في تغيير إعداداتك لدينا تفضيل أن نسأل الرجاء تعطيل مانع الإعلانات (أو تحديث إعداداتك لضمان تمكين جافا سكريبت وملفات تعريف الارتباط)، حتى نتمكن من الاستمرار في تزويدك بأول أخبار السوق والبيانات التي قد تتوقعها منا. الرقابة العامة على انبعاثات غازات الاحتباس الحراري تناقش هذه المادة الجهود التي تبذلها الولايات المتحدة لمكافحة انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة، وبصفة رئيسية ثاني أكسيد الكربون، من خلال المفاوضات الدولية، والتشريعات المحلية الجديدة، باستخدام قانون الهواء النظيف. وينصب التركيز على التطورات في عامي 2009 و 2010. وعلى الصعيد الدولي، تدعو المادة إلى الحد من المفاوضات إلى الدول العشرين المسؤولة عن ثمانين في المائة من انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة في العالم. وتقيم المادة مشاريع القوانين الرئيسية التي أدخلت على الكونغرس والتي تتناول تغير المناخ، وتخلص إلى أنها تدابير مكلفة ومعقدة ومتدخلة لإعادة توزيع الدخل. وتناقش المادة بعد ذلك استخدام القوانین القائمة في جھود واسعة النطاق تقودھا التقاضي وتقاضيھا للحد من انبعاثات ثاني أکسید الکربون. وكان تركيز الغلاف الجوي العالمي لثاني أكسيد الكربون في أوقات ما قبل التصنيع حوالي 280 جزء في المليون في عام 2009 كان 386.3 جزء في المليون. وفي الفترة من 2000 إلى 2007 كان النمو في انبعاثات ثاني أكسيد الكربون 3.5 في السنة (2). وفي عام 2007 كانت الزيادة في الغلاف الجوي كان ثاني أآسيد الكربون 2. 2 جزء في المليون، وهو أعلى من الزيادة السنوية السنوية البالغة 2 جزء في المليون للعقد السابق .3 ويعتقد أن هذه الزيادة في ترآيز ثاني أآسيد الكربون وغازات الدفيئة الأخرى، ولا سيما الميثان وأآسيد النيتروز (نوكس) من المصادر البشرية، (4). أول أكسيد غازات السلائف وأكاسيد النيتروجين والمركبات العضوية المتطايرة غير الميثانية تساهم بشكل غير مباشر في الاحترار العالمي (5). ويمكن أن تؤثر الهباء الجوي الكبريتات، وهي جسيمات صغيرة أو قطرات سائلة تنتج غالبا عن انبعاثات ثاني أكسيد الكبريت، على الامتصاص وخصائص الغلاف الجوي، ولها تأثير تبريد مناخي .6 كما أن عدة فئات من الهالوكربونات المحتوية على الفلور والكلور والبروم هي أيضا غازات الدفيئة (7). وهذه المركبات تعرف باسم مركبات الكلوروفلوروكربونات، ومركبات الهيدروفلوروكربون، والهيدروكربون المشبع بالفلور، والهالونات (وهي مركبات الهالوكربون التي تحتوي على البروم)، والسادس فلوريد الكبريت. وفي عام 2008، بلغت انبعاثات ثاني أآسيد الكربون في الولايات المتحدة 5921.2 مليون طن متري .8 وبالإضافة إلى ذلك، تم انبعاث 567.6 مليون طن من مكافئ ثاني أآسيد الكربون (CO2e)، و 318.2 مليون طن من ثاني أآسيد الكربون، وآميات أقل بكثير من غازات الدفيئة الأخرى (9) منذ عام 1990 وانبعاثات غاز الميثان وأكاسيد النيتروجين، ولكن انبعاثات ثاني أآسيد الكربون ازدادت بمتوسط ​​سنوي قدره 0.85.10 انبعاثات ثاني أآسيد الكربون الناجمة عن مصادر احتراق الوقود الأحفوري تمثل 94.16 من إجمالي انبعاثات ثاني أآسيد الكربون 11. وبالتالي فإن مراقبة احتراق الوقود الأحفوري هي محور مراقبة غازات الدفيئة في الولايات المتحدة. أنتجت مولدات الطاقة الكهربائية 39.91 من ثاني أكسيد الكربون في عام 2008 أنتج قطاع النقل 30.15.12 ولكن نظرا لانتشار انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة بسرعة، فإن تركيز هذه الغازات في جميع أنحاء العالم ثابت تقريبا (13)، وبالتالي فإن الاستجابة الفعالة يجب أن تشمل العديد من الدول. II. الاستجابة القانونية الدولية لتغير المناخ (14) في عام 1992، عقد مؤتمر الأمم المتحدة المعني بالبيئة والتنمية، المعروف شعبيا باسم قمة الأرض، في ريو دي جانيرو بالبرازيل حيث حضر 178 بلدا (15). وأنتج اجتماع ريو جدول أعمال القرن 21 وثيقة مكونة من 800 صفحة مقسمة إلى أربعة أقسام وتغطي أربعين موضوعا، كان مخططا للسياسة البيئية والإنمائية للعقود المقبلة (16).وقد دفعت معظم البلدان المتقدمة النمو جدول أعمال بيئيا، ولكن البلدان النامية تهتم أساسا بالتنمية الاقتصادية. ولا يزال هذا الانقسام في آراء الأمم اليوم قائما، مما يجعل الاتفاق على الجهود المناسبة للتصدي لتغير المناخ أمرا صعبا. وأصدر مؤتمر الأمم المتحدة المعني بالبيئة والتنمية الاتفاقية الإطارية بشأن تغير المناخ لمعالجة تغير المناخ الذي كان أول اتفاق دولي للتصدي لتغير المناخ (17).وكانت البلدان المتقدمة النمو، بما فيها الولايات المتحدة، هي خفض انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة التي لا تخضع وبروتوكول مونتريال إلى مستويات عام 1990 بحلول عام 2000 على أساس غير ملزم ([18]). ولا تصنف الاتفاقية الإطارية بشأن تغير المناخ غازات الدفيئة كملوثات ولكنها تعرفها بأنها المكونات الغازية في الغلاف الجوي، سواء كانت طبيعية أو بشرية المنشأ، التي تستوعب الأشعة تحت الحمراء وتعيد تأهيلها (19) وافق مجلس الشيوخ بالإجماع على الاتفاقية الإطارية بشأن تغير المناخ في 7 أكتوبر 1992، على أن يكون مفهوما أن الاتفاقية الإطارية لم تضع أهدافا ملزمة قانونا أو جداول زمنية للحد من انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة، ولن توافق الإدارة على تعديلات أو بروتوكولات للمعاهدة التي تخلق التزاما ملزما للحد من الانبعاثات دون موافقة مجلس الشيوخ اللاحقة .20 الرئيس جورج هو ووقع بوش المعاهدة في 13 أكتوبر / تشرين الأول 1992، 21 وفي 21 مارس / آذار 1994، دخلت الاتفاقية حيز النفاذ بعد أن صدقت عليها خمسون دولة. (22) وبحلول عام 2009، صدق 192 بلدا على الاتفاقية الإطارية بشأن تغير المناخ. ألف - تطور الاتفاقية الإطارية بشأن تغير المناخ بعد بدء نفاذ الاتفاقية الإطارية بشأن تغير المناخ، بدأت الأطراف في الاتفاق تجتمع كل سنة لمعالجة قضايا تغير المناخ. وفي عام 1995، عقد أول مؤتمر للأطراف في الاتفاقية الإطارية بشأن تغير المناخ في برلين. وفي المؤتمر الثاني للأطراف في جنيف، أشارت الولايات المتحدة لأول مرة إلى أنها مستعدة لوضع أهداف ملزمة قانونا لخفض انبعاثات ثاني أآسيد الكربون في الولايات المتحدة. 24 إن المؤتمر الثالث للأطراف (COP - 3)، المعقودة في 110 كانون الأول / ديسمبر 1997، في كيوتو، اليابان، بروتوكول كيوتو الملحق باتفاقية الأمم المتحدة الإطارية بشأن تغير المناخ (بروتوكول كيوتو أو بروتوكول كيوتو). ويقسم البروتوكول الدول إلى البلدان المدرجة في المرفق الأول والبلدان غير المدرجة في المرفق الأول ([25]). وتصنف البلدان المتقدمة النمو الدول المدرجة في المرفق الأول، التي تضم دول منظمة التعاون والتنمية في الميدان الاقتصادي اعتبارا من عام 1992، ودول أوروبا الشرقية والوسطى، والدول الأوروبية من الاتحاد السوفياتي السابق (26). والدول غير المدرجة في المرفق الأول هي دول نامية (27).ويطالب بروتوكول كيوتو بتخفيضات غازات الدفيئة من ثمانية وثلاثين دولة، والبلدان التي تضم الجماعة الأوروبية، وهي الدول المدرجة في المرفق الأول (28) ، وافقت الأطراف المدرجة في المرفق الأول على خفض انبعاثات ثاني أكسيد الكربون الناجمة عن الأنشطة البشرية من غازات الدفيئة الست المدرجة في المرفق ألف بنسبة لا تقل عن خمسة في المائة عن مستويات عام 1990 بحلول عام 20082012. 29 وافقت الولايات المتحدة على خفض بنسبة 7 في المائة، وافق الاتحاد الأوروبي على تخفيض بنسبة 8 في المائة، ووافقت اليابان على خفض انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة بنسبة 6 في المائة (30).ويجري تنفيذ هذه التخفيضات باستخدام القوانين المحلية للدول المصدقة. 31 لا تتحمل الدول غیر المدرجة في المرفق الأول أي التزامات للحد من الانبعاثات خلال الفترة المشمولة بالتغطیة التي تنتھي في عام 2012. 32 وتحدد کل دولة متقدمة کیفیة قیاس مدى امتثالھا وتقدیم انبعاثاتھا إلی السلطات الدولیة. 33 یمکن أن تعوض کل دولة من الدول المتقدمة انبعاثاتھا عن طریق توسیع غاباتھا أو وذلك باستخدام آليات السوق المحددة المبينة أدناه (34). والهدف من بروتوكول كيوتو هو أن تقوم الدول المتقدمة بتخفيض استخدامها للوقود الأحفوري، ولكن لا توجد آلية فعالة لضمان الامتثال (35). وقد تركت الكثير من التفاصيل المتعلقة بتطوير البرامج والامتثال لها ([34]). وفي مؤتمر الأطراف الرابع الذي عقد في بوينس آيرس عام 1998، وقعت الولايات المتحدة على بروتوكول كيوتو ([37]). ومع ذلك، ونظرا لأن البروتوكول كان معارضا بشدة من جانب العديد من أعضاء مجلس الشيوخ، لم تقدم إدارة كلينتون وبروتوكول مجلس الشيوخ للتصديق عليه ([38]). ويعارض مجلس الشيوخ الأساس المنطقي الرئيسي لمعارضة البروتوكول هو الاقتصاد المعاكس المتوقع (39). وقد وقعت ثلاثة وثلاثون بلدا بالإضافة إلى الدول الأعضاء الخمسة عشر في الاتحاد الأوروبي البروتوكول بين 16 مارس / آذار 1998 و 15 مارس / آذار 1999، بما في ذلك جميع الأطراف المدرجة في المرفق الأول باستثناء اثنين، مما يدل على قبولها (40). ولكي يبدأ نفاذ البروتوكول، كان لا بد من التصديق على البروتوكول (أو اعتماده أو الموافقة عليه أو الانضمام إليه) من قبل خمسة وخمسين طرفا في الاتفاقية، بما في ذلك الأطراف المدرجة في المرفق الأول والتي تمثل خمسة وخمسين في المائة من ثاني أكسيد الكربون وقد تم التصديق على بروتوكول كيوتو بحلول أيار / مايو 2002. (42) وفي 16 شباط / فبراير 2005، دخل بروتوكول كيوتو حيز النفاذ بعد أن أصبحت روسيا الدولة ال 127 التي صدقت على البروتوكول (43). ولم يحدث تطور كبير في مؤتمر الأطراف الخامس في عام 1999، في بون، ألمانيا (44). وأدى المؤتمر السادس للأطراف، الذي اجتمع في عام 2000 في لاهاي، إلى اتفاقات بون التي تتناول الشؤون المالية آليات المرونة complia (45). وفي الاجتماع السابع لمؤتمر الأطراف الذي عقد في مراكش، المغرب، اعتمد الطرفان اتفاقات مراكش التي تتعلق بإقراضات الانبعاثات لمختلف الإجراءات التي تشمل أطرافا ثالثة ، كانت حلا وسطا لاسترضاء اليابان وروسيا .46 ورفضت اليابان الموافقة على عواقب ملزمة قانونا لعدم الامتثال لبروتوكول كيوتو المصادق عليه، وتركت عواقب عدم الامتثال في المستقبل. 47 المفاوضات بشأن أفضل السبل لتنفيذها واستمر بروتوكول كيوتو في نيودلهي بالهند في عام 2002 في مؤتمر الأطراف في مؤتمر إيغث الذي أصدر إعلان دلهي الذي أكد من جديد أن التنمية والقضاء على الفقر من الأولويات القصوى في البلدان النامية، ([49]). ولم يؤد مؤتمر الأطراف التاسع (كوب-9) في ميلانو، إيطاليا، في عام 2003، إلى اتفاق بشأن أي شيء ذي أهمية (49) (كوب-10) في عام 2004 في بوينس آيرس بالأرجنتين، إلى اتخاذ قرارات بشأن مجموعة متنوعة من القضايا بما في ذلك استخدام الأراضي والحراجة ونقل التكنولوجيا (50). وشملت الخطة خططا لإطلاق برنامج لتداول الانبعاثات في الاتحاد الأوروبي، إلى البلدان األوروبية التي أنشأت نظام االتحاد األوروبي لتداول االنبعاثات من أجل تنظيم انبعاثات ثاني أكسيد الكربون من حوالي 12،000 مرفق. إن المؤتمر الحادي عشر لألطراف إلى االتفاقية اإلطارية بشأن تغير المناخ واالجتماع األول لألطراف في بروتوكول كيوتو) موب-1 (، في مونتريال في عام 2005. وقد اجتمع الاجتماع الأول لمؤتمر الأطراف الذي عقد في 157 بلدا (ولكن ليس الولايات المتحدة أو أستراليا)، واجتماع مؤتمر الأطراف الحادي عشر للدول ال 189 المشاركة في الاتفاقية الإطارية بشأن تغير المناخ. وانتهى المؤتمر باتفاق لبدء مناقشات بشأن التزامات ما بعد عام 2012، واتفاق من جانب الولايات المتحدة على المشاركة في حوار بشأن كيفية مكافحة تغير المناخ (52). أما مؤتمر الأطراف الثاني عشر (كوب-12) وعقدت اجتماعات في نيروبي، كينيا في عام 2006 (53). وتعهدت البلدان المشاركة باستعراض فعالية بروتوكول كيوتو في عام 2008 واتخاذ إجراءات نهائية بشأن عدة مبادرات، بما في ذلك إنشاء صندوق للتكيف لمساعدة البلدان النامية على التحضير لآثار الاحترار العالمي. وقرر الطرفان إرجاء اتخاذ إجراء بشأن ما إذا كان ينبغي أن تكون تكنولوجيات احتجاز الكربون وتخزينه مؤهلة في إطار آلية التنمية النظيفة (55). إن مؤتمر الأطراف الثالث عشر (كوب-13) والاجتماع الثالث للأطراف في بروتوكول كيوتو (اجتماع الأطراف الثالث ) في كانون الأول / ديسمبر 2007 في بالي، إندونيسيا (56). وقد صدقت أستراليا على بروتوكول كيوتو، الذي ترك الولايات المتحدة بوصفها الدولة الصناعية الكبرى الوحيدة التي لا تكون سنويا (57). وفي الاجتماع، واصل أعضاء الاتحاد الأوروبي الضغط على الولايات المتحدة لتقديم التزامات محددة للحد من انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة، واستمرت الولايات المتحدة في المقاومة (58). وواصلت البلدان النامية السعي للحصول على مزيد من المساعدة في شكل (59). وكان من التطورات الهامة الاتفاق على العملية التي ستستخدم في صندوق التكيف مع تغير المناخ الذي يديره مرفق البيئة العالمية مع البنك الدولي بصفته الوصي (60). وبلغت المخصصات الأولية للصندوق 67 مليونا التي جاءت من ضريبة قدرها٪ 2 على المعامالت المتعلقة بآلية التنمية النظيفة، ولكنها أقل بكثير مما هو مطلوب للتعامل بفعالية مع التكيف في العالم النامي. 61 وأدى االجتماع إلى الدول النامية، للمرة األولى، (62). وكان مضمون معاهدة تحل محل كيوتو بعد عام 2012 الموضوع الرئيسي الذي نوقش في (كوب-14) والاجتماع الرابع للأطراف في بروتوكول كيوتو (موب-4) الذي عقد في بوزنان ببولندا في كانون الأول / ديسمبر 2008. وصوتت الأطراف على بدء تشغيل صندوق التكيف اعتبارا من 1 يناير 2009 (63). وصوتوا على تحديث برنامج نقل التكنولوجيا، ووافقوا على برنامج حافز للغابات يعرف باسم خفض الانبعاثات الناجمة عن إزالة الغابات في البلدان النامية (64). وقد فشل الاجتماع في التوصل إلى اتفاق بشأن ما إذا كان ينبغي إدراج احتجاز الكربون واحتجازه في آلية التنمية النظيفة (65). ومنذ الاجتماع الذي عقد في الشهر الأخير من إدارة بوش، تركت القرارات الهامة المتعلقة بمشاركة الولايات المتحدة في اجتماع عام 2009 (66). وأعرب الطرفان عن أملهما في إبرام اتفاق جديد يحل محل بروتوكول كيوتو في المؤتمر الخامس عشر (كوب-15) والاجتماع الخامس للأطراف في بروتوكول كيوتو (موب-5) الذي سيعقد في كوبنهاغن، الدانمرك في 71 ديسمبر / كانون الأول 2009. في المؤتمر الخامس عشر (كوب-15) والاجتماع الخامس للأطراف في بروتوكول كيوتو (كوب-كوب) في كوبنهاغن في ديسمبر / كانون الأول 718، 2009، حاول المفاوضون وضع الصيغة النهائية لاتفاق جديد يتناول التخفيف والتكيف والتكنولوجيا والتمويل . وأعلنت الولايات المتحدة أنها ستوافق على هدف خفض انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة بنسبة 17 في المائة بحلول عام 2020 عن مستويات عام 2005، وهو ما يقل كثيرا عما كانت الدول المتقدمة الأخرى تدعو إليه (67). ولم توافق الصين على التخفيضات، ولكنها قالت إنها ستخفض الكربون على الرغم من أن ذلك من شأنه أن يسمح بزيادة انبعاثاتها (68). وتشكل كثافة الكربون نسبة انبعاثات ثاني أكسيد الكربون إلى الناتج الاقتصادي. وكثافة الكربون هي كمية ثاني أآسيد الكربون، التي يعبر عنها بالطن المتري، والتي تم إصدارها لكل ألف دولار أمريكي من الناتج المحلي الإجمالي. 69 ولا يتعلق ذلك بانبعاثات ثاني أآسيد الكربون للفرد. وكثيرا ما يكون للدول النامية انبعاثات كربونية عالية لكل دولار من الناتج المحلي الإجمالي وانبعاثات منخفضة الكربون للفرد الواحد. وتراوحت كثافة الكربون في عام 2006 من 6.77 مليون طن في أوكرانيا و 6.27 مليون طن في أوزبكستان و 4.83 مليون طن في إيران إلى 2.85 مليون طن في الصين و 1.80 مليون طن في الهند و 0.24 طن في اليابان و 0.52 مليون طن في الولايات المتحدة. فإن الزيادة المحتملة في انبعاثات الكربون هائلة، ولكن في حين أن زيادة انبعاثاتها سوف تؤثر تأثيرا خطيرا على مناخ العالم يمكن أن تنخفض شدة انبعاثاتها (71). ويؤيد دعم الصين للحد من شدة الكربون مقترح عام 2002 المقدم من الرئيس جورج دبليو بوش (72) الذي دعا إلى بذل جهد طوعي للحد من كثافة الكربون بنسبة ثمانية عشر في المائة بحلول عام 2012 (73). ولم يكن هذا مقترحا هاما لأن كثافة الكربون في الولايات المتحدة بلغت ذروتها في عام 1917 وانخفضت بمعدل 1.5 في المائة كل عام دون جهد حكومي .74 وانخفضت انبعاثات ثاني أكسيد الكربون في الولايات المتحدة من 533،000 مليون طن لكل مليار من الناتج الاقتصادي في عام 1997 إلى 426،000 طن متري لكل مليار في عام 2007، معدلة للتضخم (75) ز لا شيء في حين التظاهر لتكون قلقة للبيئة كانت استجابة للمشاكل البيئية على الصعيدين المحلي والدولي للحكومة. وانتهى مؤتمر الأطراف في دورته الخامسة عشرة دون التوصل إلى اتفاق. وقد عرقلت المفاوضات الخلافات القوية بين الدول المتقدمة والنامية. وكانت الدول الثلاث المنتجة للنفط هي بوليفيا ونيكاراغوا وفنزويلاوير التي تعمل على منع التوصل إلى اتفاق (76). وكانت النتيجة الوحيدة لأي أهمية هي الاتفاق غير الملزم (77) الذي توصلت إليه الولايات المتحدة والصين والهند والبرازيل وجنوب أفريقيا، من حوالي اثني عشر زعيما في العالم حصلوا على اعتراف رسمي باتفاق سياسي (ولكن ليس قانونيا). 77 وقد عارضت العديد من الدول الأعضاء في مجموعة ال 77، التي هي بلدان نامية 79 الاتفاق. وتدعو إلى الحد من درجة الحرارة العالمية إلى أقل من درجتين مئويتين، والتزام البلدان المتقدمة بمساعدة البلدان النامية في إجراءات التخفيف، ووضع مبادئ توجيهية للقياس والإبلاغ والتحقق، ولكن لا توجد ولايات (80). ولا يوجد في الاتفاق أي أهداف للحد من انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة. وینبغي أن یقوم کل بلد بتطویر أھداف للخفض باستخدام 1990 أو 2005 کخط أساس. 81 یدعو الاتفاق إلی صندوق یبلغ 30 ملیار دولار لدعم جھود التخفیف في البلدان الفقیرة بین عامي 2010 و 2012، ومن المقرر أن یرتفع الصندوق إلی 100 ملیار عام في عام 2020، 82 ولكن لم يتم تحديد مصدر للمال. وفي أواخر يوليو / متوز 2010، كان لدى الصندوق 21 مليونا، وهو ما جاء أساسا من الضريبة على مشاريع آلية التنمية النظيفة. وتعهد الرئيس أوباما بخفض انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة بنسبة 17 في املائة من خط أساس عام 2005 بحلول عام 2020، ولكن تعهده ليس ملزما للكونغرس. 84 وستستمر الجهود الرامية إلى التفاوض على اتفاق جديد لاستبدال كيوتو بالمؤتمر السادس عشر للأطراف المقرر عقده في كانكون، المكسيك، 29 تشرين الثاني / نوفمبر إلى 10 كانون الأول / ديسمبر 2010 (85). باء - مواطن الضعف في نهج القانون الدولي السكان والنمو وارتفاع مستوى المعيشة هما العاملان الرئيسيان اللذان يسهمان في زيادة تركيزات ثاني أكسيد الكربون في الغلاف الجوي ([86]). وقد ازدادت انبعاثات ثاني أكسيد الكربون في العالم من احتراق الوقود الأحفوري بأكثر من أربعة أضعاف منذ عام 1950 (87)، وزاد عدد سكان العالم 268 منذ عام 1950 (888). وينبغي أن يكون تثبيت السكان عنصرا هاما من أي برنامج يحاول التعامل مع قضايا تغير المناخ، ولكن سياسة لتحقيق الاستقرار في الولايات المتحدة أو سكان العالم ليست جامعة ولاية نيويورك وقد ساهمت الدول المتقدمة (الدول المدرجة في المرفق الأول) بنحو اثنتين وسبعين في المائة من مجموع ثاني أآسيد الكربون المتراكم في الغلاف الجوي بسبب الإطلاقات بين عامي 1950 و 2000 (90). غير أن نسبة انبعاثات ثاني أآسيد الكربون في العالم ساهمت بنسبة فإن الولايات المتحدة وغيرها من البلدان المدرجة في المرفق الأول آخذة في الانخفاض لأن البلدان النامية توسع سكانها واستخدام الفرد للطاقة على السواء. الولايات المتحدة، التي انتقلت في عام 2006 من أكبر مساهم في ثاني أكسيد الكربون في العالم إلى المركز الثاني، وراء الصين، هي ثالث أكثر السكان اكتظاظا بالسكان مع 4.54 من سكان العالم يستخدم 21 من الطاقة في العالم. وتنبعث منها 20.22 من ثاني أكسيد الكربون في العالم و 19 من انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة في العالم (92). وقد أنبعثت الولايات المتحدة 19.78 مليون طن من ثاني أكسيد الكربون للفرد في عام 2006، حيث انبعثت الصين 4.58 مليون طن والبرازيل 2.01mt.93 ومع ذلك، كان نصيب الفرد من ثاني أكسيد الكربون وانبعاثات أقل من 0.5 مليون طن، وتشاد كان نصيب الفرد من الانبعاثات 0.02 مليون طن. 94 وكان نصيب الفرد من انبعاثات قطر 61.19 مليون طن، وبلغت الانبعاثات في الإمارات العربية المتحدة 35.05 مليون طن، ولكن في اليمن القريب كان نصيب الفرد من انبعاثات ثاني أكسيد الكربون 0.84mt.95 في كانت البلدان النامية في عام 2000 مسؤولة عن 39 من انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة الصادرة عن أكبر 20 بائعا. (96) إن دور البلدان النامية أكبر إلى حد ما إذا كنت تحسب انبعاثات الكربون لتشمل الانبعاثات المنسوبة إلى تغيرات استخدام الأراضي. وكانت البلدان الصناعية مسؤولة عن 48.4 من انبعاثات ثاني أكسيد الكربون، استنادا إلى انبعاثات احتراق الوقود الأحفوري في عام 2000، ولكنها كانت مسؤولة عن 39.2 فقط إذا كانت انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة في مكافئات ثاني أكسيد الكربون تشمل تقديرات انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة استنادا إلى التغيرات في استخدام الأراضي (97) فإن بروتوكول كيوتو هو فشله في معالجة النمو في الانبعاثات من البلدان النامية، بما في ذلك الصين والهند والبرازيل، التي تعد مساهما رئيسيا في غازات الدفيئة وهي منافسيها الاقتصاديين للولايات المتحدة. ويشجع بروتوكول كيوتو هجرة الأعمال التجارية، المعروفة باسم التسرب، إلى البلدان غير المدرجة في المرفق الأول لأنها لا تملك متطلبات خفض ثاني أكسيد الكربون. وتعد الصين أكثر الدول استهلاكا للطاقة في العالم، وكانت مسؤولة عن 20.61 من انبعاثات ثاني أكسيد الكربون في العالم من الوقود الأحفوري في عام 2006. 98 انبعاثات ثاني أكسيد الكربون العالمية من استخدام الوقود الأحفوري زادت بمقدار 5.185 مليار طن متري من 2000 إلى 2006 كانت الصين مسؤولة عن 58.85 من هذه الزيادة زاد استخدام الطاقة في الصين بنسبة 71.5 في غضون خمس سنوات (2001-2006)، أي بزيادة سنوية قدرها 11.400 في المائة. وفي السنوات الخمس نفسها، تضاعفت تقريبا قدرة توليد الطاقة الكهربائية في الصين واستهلاك الفحم فيها (101) في عام 2005، وستتجاوز انبعاثاتها المتوقعة جميع التخفيضات التي تقتضيها كيوتو، إذا كان البروتوكول قد نفذ بالفعل، وهو ليس كذلك (102). وارتفع استهلاك الصين من النفط من 4.80 مليون برميل يوميا ( مليون برميل يوميا في عام 2000 إلى 7.57 مليون برميل يوميا في عام 2007 (103). وتمثل الزيادة في الصين ما يقرب من ثلث الزيادة العالمية في استهلاك النفط من عام 2003 حتى عام 2007، على الرغم من أن استهلاكها لا يتجاوز 42.5 من الولايات المتحدة في عام 1990، كان لدى الصين 1.622 مليون سيارة مسجلة، في عام 2007 كان هناك 13.758 مليون سيارة مسجلة، وهو ما يمثل زيادة سنوية قدرها 10.3 منذ عام 1997 (105). وأصبحت الصين ثاني أكبر مصنع للسيارات، بعد اليابان، وفي عام 2008 أنتجت 935.101 مركبة ، في حين أن الولايات المتحدة أنتجت 8،705،239 سيارة (106). وبالتالي، فإن أي اتفاق دولي لا يفرض قيودا على انبعاثات الصين من غير المحتمل أن يجد دعما من مجلس الشيوخ في الولايات المتحدة. إن بروتوكول كيوتو أكثر شدة بالنسبة للولايات المتحدة منه بالنسبة لأوروبا. ويدعو البروتوكول إلى تخفيضات الانبعاثات اعتبارا من سنة الأساس لعام 1990. وبسبب تراجع اقتصاد بلدان الاتحاد السوفييتي السابق وألمانيا الشرقية، يمكن لأوروبا أن تمتثل لالتزاماتها عن طريق خفض الانبعاثات بنسبة قليلة. 107 ومنذ عام 1990، ازداد عدد سكان الولايات المتحدة بأكثر من 60 مليون نسمة (108) فإن مجموعة الدول الثمانیة الأخرى (G-8) لا تمثل سوى ثلث زیادة الولایات المتحدة. 109 ولأنھ لا توجد عقوبات فعالة لعدم قدرة الدول علی الوفاء بتخفیضات الانبعاثات الواردة في بروتوکول کیوتو، فإن الدول حرة نسبیا في تجاهل الاتفاق. وعلاوة على ذلك، تتمتع الأمة بحرية كبيرة في النظر في كيفية رصد الانبعاثات والإبلاغ عنها. وقد تؤدي صعوبة الحصول على بيانات دقيقة للرصد وفي ضمان الامتثال إلى برامج لا تؤدي إلى تخفيضات فعلية. وإذا انضمت الولايات المتحدة إلى البروتوكول، أو خلفه، سيتعين عليه سن تشريعات محلية لتنفيذ التزاماته. وسوف تخضع القوانين واللوائح المرتبطة بها لتحدي المواطن وربما إلى دعاوى المواطنين اللاحقة لضمان الامتثال. وستتعرض الحكومة الامريكية لضغوط قانونية وسياسية كبيرة لتحقيق هدف البروتوكول حتى لو كانت الدولة الوحيدة التى تمتثل لها. ويمكن أن يكون التأثير السلبي على الاقتصاد الأمريكي كبيرا دون أن يقابل ذلك فائدة بيئية كبيرة. زادت انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة العالمية من المصادر البشرية 26 من 1990 إلى 2005، وانبعاثات ثاني أآسيد الكربون، التي تشكل ما يقرب من ثلاثة أرباع المجموع، زادت 31.110 انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة في الولايات المتحدة زادت 14 من 1990 إلى 2008، وازدادت انبعاثات ثاني أآسيد الكربون 16.111 بين عامي 1995 و 2000 انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة فإن الانبعاثات زادت بأکثر من 6 سنویا من عام 2000 إلی عام 2005، کانت الزیادة السنویة 15، وفقا للمفوضیة الأوروبیة .121 ومع ذلك، فإن وزارة الطاقة الأمریکیة (دو) تبلغ عن زیادة أقل بکثیر في انبعاثات ثاني أکسید الکربون في العالم من استخدام الوقود الأحفوري من 21.59 من 2000 إلى 2006.113. والتغير األكثر أهمية هو تأثير الدول الصناعية. وفي الفترة من عام 2005 إلى عام 2006، انخفضت البلدان المتقدمة النمو التي تضم منظمة التعاون والتنمية في الميدان الاقتصادي انبعاثاتها من ثاني أكسيد الكربون المرتبطة بالطاقة بمقدار 0.3، ولكن الدول غير الأعضاء في منظمة التعاون والتنمية في الميدان الاقتصادي نمت بمقدار 5.2.114 ومن المتوقع أن تبلغ الانبعاثات من بلدان منظمة التعاون والتنمية في الميدان الاقتصادي من عام 2006 إلى عام 2030 زيادة سنوية من 0،3، وهو ما يعادل سابع الزيادة المتوقعة في الانبعاثات من خارج منظمة التعاون والتنمية في الميدان الاقتصادي والتي تبلغ 2،2،151. ومن المتوقع أن يكون معدل النمو السنوي في انبعاثات ثاني أكسيد الكربون المتصلة بالطاقة في الصين 2،8 في الفترة من عام 2006 إلى عام 2030، ومن المتوقع أن تبلغ بقية بلدان آسيا وزيادة انبعاثاتها في 2.7، في حين يتوقع أن تبلغ البرازيل 2.5 و الهند 2.1 في السنة .166 ومن المتوقع أن تكون الصين في عام 2030 مسؤولة عن 29 من انبعاثات الكربون في العالم (117). ومن غير المرجح أن تعمل محاولة إصلاح بروتوكول كيوتو. لقد آن الأوان لاعتماد نهج جديد. ومن غير المعقول التفاوض مع 170 بلدا في محاولة للتوصل إلى توافق في الآراء عندما تكون عشرين بلدا مسؤولة عن ما يقرب من ثمانين في المائة من انبعاثات ثاني أكسيد الكربون، 118 وتساهم ثماني دول فقط بالإضافة إلى الاتحاد الأوروبي بنسبة 2 في المائة أو أكثر من انبعاثات ثاني أكسيد الكربون في العالم. 119 نحن بحاجة إلى إشراك الدول المسؤولة بشكل جدي عن معظم الانبعاثات، الآن وفي المستقبل. وفي الوقت نفسه، ينبغي للولايات المتحدة أن تبذل جهدا جادا للحد من أهمية الوقود الأحفوري للاقتصاد الأمريكي بطريقة تحمي وتعزز بيئتنا واقتصادنا. III. المقترحات التشريعية المحلية في الولايات المتحدة لم تكن الجهود الدولية الرامية إلى معالجة المناخ فعالة، وحتى لو أدى هذا النهج إلى اتفاق هادف، ستكون هناك حاجة إلى تشريعات محلية لتنفيذ مثل هذا الاتفاق. فعلى مدى عشرين عاما تقريبا، اتبع المناصرون لبرنامج حكومي للتعامل مع تغير المناخ النهج الدولية المذكورة أعلاه، وعملوا على سن تشريعات محلية جديدة موضوع هذا القسم. وفي العقد الماضي، تطور توافق الآراء ببطء بأن استخدام برامج الحد من الانبعاثات من أجل التحكم في انبعاثات الكربون هو النهج الذي ينبغي اتباعه (120). غير أن هناك خلافا قويا، لا سيما من جانب الجمهوريين، بشأن ما إذا كانت هناك حاجة إلى تشريعات، ينبغي أن تتضمن عقوبات اقتصادية على استخدام الوقود الأحفوري. وتستند المعارضة أيضا إلى الشواغل المتعلقة بكيفية إدارة هذا البرنامج وكيفية استخدام الإيرادات المتأتية من برنامج الحد الأقصى للتبادل التجاري. هذه المخاوف تمنع الاتفاق بين الحزبين. ومنذ عام 2007، تناولت العديد من مشاريع القوانين المعروضة على الكونغرس تغير المناخ، ولكن لم ينجح أي شيء من الأهمية في العملية التشريعية (121). أما مشروع القانون الوحيد الذي تم إقراره من قبل مجلس النواب أو مجلس الشيوخ فهو هر 2454، ولكن مشروع قانون مجلس الشيوخ مماثل (S. 1733) يبدو أنه من غير المرجح أن يحصل على األصوات الالزمة ليصبح قانونا اعتبارا من يوليو / تموز 2010. 122 إذا تم سن أي تشريع في عام 2010، فمن المحتمل أن يقتصر على الطاقة الكهربائية ولن يشمل العقوبات االقتصادية. وهذه القوانين، التي نوقشت باختصار أدناه، على الأرجح ستكون أساسا للجهود التشريعية المقبلة. 123 أهر 2454 أمبير S. 1733 الممثل هنري واكسمان (D-كال)، رئيس لجنة الطاقة والتجارة في مجلس النواب، ورئيس (إيدس ماركي)، الذي نشر في عام 1554، قانون الموارد البشرية النظيفة والأمن لعام 2009، وهو القانون الأمريكي الأمريكي للطاقة النظيفة والأمن (ويعرف أيضا باسم مشروع قانون واكسمان-ماركي). وبعد التعديلات العديدة، في 26 يونيو 2009، وافق على 1200 صفحة هر 2454 بأصوات 219 إلى 212.125 ومنذ ذلك الحين، كان التشريع تغير المناخ في طي النسيان لأن مؤيدي التشريعات تغير المناخ لم يتمكنوا من الحصول على الأصوات اللازمة لتمرير مشروع قانون في مجلس الشيوخ. في مجلس الشيوخ، قدم رئيس لجنة البيئة والأشغال العامة، السناتور باربرا بوكسر (D-كال)، والسناتور جون كيري (D - كتلة) في 30 سبتمبر 2009 وظائف الطاقة النظيفة وقانون الطاقة الأمريكية (S. 1733)، 126 الذي يشبه هر 2454. تم الإبلاغ عن تعديل S. 1733 من لجنة البيئة والأشغال العامة عن طريق التصويت 11-1، مع عدم وجود دعم جمهوري. 127 في 2 فبراير 2010، وضعت على (128). ويعارض معظم أعضاء مجلس الشيوخ الجمهوريين مشروع قانون بوكسيركيري بسبب تكلفته وبرنامجه المتعلق بالحد الأقصى والتجارة، وفشله في توفير دور رئيسي للطاقة النووية (129). ويختلف مشروع القانون عن الموارد البشرية 2454 عن طريق الدعوة إلى والحد من غازات الدفيئة من 20 مستويات عام 2005 بحلول عام 2020، في حين يدعو مشروع قانون مجلس النواب لخفض 17 130 مشروع قانون مجلس الشيوخ يعطي لجنة تنظيم الطاقة الاتحادية (فيرك) مراقبة السوق الكربون مشروع قانون البيت يعطي المسؤولية الأساسية فيرك، ولكن لجنة السلع هو نظرا للسلطة التنظيمية على المشتقات Oversight in the Senate bill would be the responsibility of the Department of Justice in the House bill United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is responsible for oversight.132 Both bills provide relief when the cost of an allowance reaches a trigger point, but there are differences in the details.133 S. 1733 is silent on the continuing role of the Clean Air Act (CAA), but H. R. 2454 exempts new sources of GHG emissions from new source review (NSR).134 The heart of both H. R. 2454 and S. 1733 is the cap-and-trade program. H. R. 2454, Title III, amends the CAA135 to create a new Title VII that provides a cap-and-trade program that uses allowances to cap GHG emissions.136 An allowance is an intangible asset issued by EPA that allows the emission of one metric ton of CO2 or its equivalent in other GHGs.137 By specifying the number of allowances and reducing the number over time, the number of tons of GHG emissions that are allowed can be limited.138 H. R. 2454 and S. 1733 allocate most allowances without charge, but vary in who receives these valuable assets. Both bills, however, provide most of the allowances to political interests needed to pass the legislation with only small amounts going to clean technology development. S. 1733 provides about 12.7 of the value of the allowance to clean energy programs and H. R. 2454 provides about 13.8.139 H. R. 2454 provides a tax credit funded by 15 of the allowances that is to be provided to approximately 20 of the people with the lowest incomes.140 Federal payments are to be made to a single person with an income of 23,000 or less for a family with two or more children benefits are available if their income is 42,000 or less.141 The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates the credit will cost 83 billion over the 20092019 period.142 H. R. 2454 specifies the percentage of free allowances to be distributed to various classes of recipients. It requires the federal government to give away 70.4 of the allowances from 2012 to 2013, and the percentage of free allowances increases to 82.5 in 2016.143 About 75 of the allowances are to be distributed in a manner that will have no direct effect in reducing GHG emissions.144 Electric utilities are to receive 43.7 of the allowances in 2012 and 2013, which declines to 35 in 2016 to 2025.145 The natural gas industry is to receive 9 of the allowances in 2016 to 2025.146 Some or most of the value of these allowances is to be returned to consumers as specified in regulations that are to be promulgated by the states.147 These rebates will not necessarily go to those that pay higher energy costs.148 H. R. 2454 and S. 1733 do not impose obligations on the recipients of the free allowances. Other than identifying categories for allowances the legislation provides little information concerning the details of the programs to be subsidized. H. R. 2454 allocates allowances for electric utilities using a formula based 50 on historic emissions and 50 on retail sales of electricity, which requires customers of coal-burning power plants to subsidize nuclear or renewable power users.149 The projected expenditures to accomplish the goals of H. R. 2454 are estimated by the Congressional Budget Office to be 821 billion over 20102019.150 The House Committee on Energy and Commerce estimated the total value of allowances created by H. R. 2454 during the period 2010 through 2019 at approximately 825 billion and would range from 75 billion in 2015 to 105 billion in 2030.151 The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the secondary market for allowance distributed free will exceed 60 billion in 2012 and the value should increase over time.152 The ultimate costs can be expected to be much more because the program runs until the year 2050.153 In addition, the cost to state and local governments and the private sector to meet unfunded mand ates is estimated at 69 million and 139 million a year, respectively, and is expected to increase over time due to inflation.154 The cap-and-trade program being advocated by the Democratic majority will involve the financial services industry playing an important role in the trading of allowances, which creates the possibility of an expensive manipulation of the energy market such as what occurred in the mortgage-backed derivatives market.155 Because the cap is likely to be relaxed if an electric utility claims a blackout is forthcoming, it is likely to work only until it actually has an effect. The major effect of cap-and-trade as found in H. R. 2454 and S. 1733 is to create large semi-permanent subsidies for some segments of the energy industry and will involve major transfers of wealth. The allowances provided by H. R. 2454 or S. 1733 could have a value exceeding a trillion dollars over ten years156 this amount of money will create a continuous effort by potential beneficiaries to have it diverted to them, and it will lead to an expansion of the federal government to deal with this complex program. H. R. 2454, for example, requires EPA to promulgate thirty-one new regulations in twelve to thirty-six months, and make the EPA a major regulator of energy.157 Moreover, the allowance approach, despite subsidies for some industries, will make it more difficult for U. S. made goods to compete in world markets, and the attempt to impose charges on some imported goods such as those provided in the Waxman-Markey Bill, may be a violation of international free trade agreements.158 An alternative to the cap-and-trade approach is the American Clean Energy Leadership Act of 2009 (S. 1462), sponsored by Senator Jeff Bingman (D-N. M.).159 It indirectly reduces GHG emissions by encouraging efficient, alternative, and low carbon energy production and use. S. 1462 would create a Clean Energy Deployment Administration (CEDA) to facilitate breakthroughs in the deployment of clean energy technologies.160 It would provide 130 billion in loan guarantees to nuclear and fossil fuel energy projects with almost no limit on overall loan guarantees because the CEDA is exempted from the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990161 (H. R. 2454 does not exempt loan guarantees from the Federal Credit Reform Act).162 S. 1462 also requires electric utilities to meet fifteen percent of their electricity sales by 2021 using renewable energy.163 It requires the establishment of a national electrical energy transmission grid.164 FERC is required to establish national interconnection standards for power production facilities of fifteen kilowatts or less to encourage residential-sized distributed generation.165 It calls for improving protection for the grid including protection from cyber attacks.166 It also calls for the federal government to improve the efficiency of homes, equipment, and appliances to reduce energy use.167 It calls for opening the Eastern Gulf of Mexico to expanded oil and gas production.168 It seeks to reform the energy planning process by requiring a comprehensive federal energy plan to be produced every four years.169 S. 1462 was reported out of the Energy and Natural Resources Committee in June 2009 and enjoys more broad-based support than the bills discussed above.170 C. 2010 Developments After Scott Brown (R-Mass.) replaced Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.), the Republicans achieved the ability to sustain a filibuster. To respond to the potential legislative gridlock, several senators drafted the American Power Act.171 The bill is primarily the work of Senator John Kerry (D-Mass.), Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator Joe Lieberman (I-Conn.), Chairman of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee.172 Senator Lindsey Graham (R-S. C.) played a major role until he ended his participation because Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) indicated he planned to take up immigration reform before dealing with the climate change legislation.173 This compromise bill deals with energy policy and climate change through a comprehensive program that involves the federal government playing a more important role in nearly every aspect of the nations economy. The bill aims to reduce CO2e emissions by 17 in 2020 and by over 80 by 2050.174 The nearly one thousand pages of the bill are divided into six titles. Title I subsidizes nuclear power, encourages domestic oil and gas production (including offshore production), subsidizes carbon capture and sequestration deployment, and supports energy efficiency improvement programs.175 Title II mandates GHG reduction through a cap-and-trade program, with both floor and ceiling prices, which adds a new Title VII to the CAA.176 This title also adds new requirements for hydrofluorocarbons and black carbon.177 Title III is titled Consumer Protection.178 It specifies how the allowances that are distributed will be used to benefit energy consumers including relief for households with incomes of up to 250 of the poverty line.179 Title IV is titled Job Protection and Growth.180 It is primarily a subsidy program for industry that will offset the costs of compliance with the bills GHG emissions reduction requirements, and it provides for charges to be imposed on imports from countries that have not taken action to limit GHG emissions.181 Title IV also has a p rogram to subsidize natural gas-powered vehicle production and use, and it contains a carbon biological sequestration program that is a subsidy for the agriculture industry.182 Title V is a program to fund international efforts to reduce GHG emissions and to fund mitigation and adaptation efforts.183 Title VI has various provisions aimed at protecting communities from climate change impacts through adaptation strategies.184 Title I, Subtitle A subsidies to encourage the expansion of nuclear power include provisions for an expedited combined construction and operating license,185 a loan guarantee program,186 expedited environmental review,187 and numerous tax benefits.188 Funding for nuclear loan guarantees would be increased from about 18.4 billion to 54 billion, which is consistent with the latest budget request.189 Subtitle B increases revenue sharing with states that allow offshore oil and gas drilling but strengthens the right of states to prohibit leasing within seventy-five miles of its coastline.190 But, it would place a moratorium on new offshore drilling until the cause of the Deepwater Horizon offshore oilrig explosion is determined and require liability mechanisms that ensure adequate funds are available to mitigate the economic and environmental impacts of offshore drilling accidents.191 The offshore drilling provisions were placed in the legislation to attract support from Republicans and pro-drilling Democrats, but following the British Petroleum oil spill, this provision generated substantial opposition.192 Subtitle C provides for a program to encourage the commercialization of carbon capture and sequestration technology to enable coal to be used with reduced adverse environmental impact.193 Subtitle C would impose new performance standards on coal-fired power plants through a new CAA Title VIIIGreenhouse Gas Standards.194 The aim of this part is to require coal-burning power plants to utilize geological sequestration as soon as it is commercially dem onstrated.195 Title I, Subtitle D encourages renewable energy and energy efficiency program development through loans, subsidies, and support for state operated renewable energy markets.196 Subtitle E provides for the development of electric-drive vehicle refueling infrastructure.197 It requires states and metropolitan planning organizations to plan and implement a program to reduce GHG emissions through transportation-related efforts as specified in a new CAA section 803.198 This is to be financed using distributed allowances as specified in a new CAA section 781(f)(3)199 and by using money from the Highway Trust Fund.200 Subtitle F establishes a Clean Energy Technology Fund to support the development of advanced energy technologies.201 The renewable energy and energy efficiency programs would receive 2.5 of the allowances, which is estimated to amount to 8.8 billion in the first year.202 This is substantially less than the estimated 67.8 billion provided in H. R. 2454 and the estimate d 51.3 billion provided in S. 1733 for the first year.203 Title II contains the program to reduce GHG emissions through the new CAA Title VII program. New CAA section 702 would call for GHG emissions to be 95.25 of the 2005 emissions in 2013 83 in 2020 58 in 2030 and 17 in 2050.204 New CAA section 703 would require sources subject to caps to emit 95.25 of their 2005 emissions in 2013 83 in 2020 58 in 2030 and 17 in 2050.205 Thus, most of the serious reductions are required twenty years from enactment. Part B designates seven GHGs: CO2, methane, NOx, sulfur hexafluoride, hydrofluorocarbons from chemical manufacturing process at a stationary source, any perfluorocarbon that is an anthropogenic gas with a 100-year global warming impact equal to or greater than CO2, and nitrogen trifluoride.206 GHGs do not include gases that are captured and sequestered, but the sequestration site is a covered entity.207 The CO2e values of the GHGs are listed in new CAA section 712.208 New CAA section 713 requires EPA to revise its GHG reporting regulations to comply with the requirements of the American Power Act including reporting on the capture and sequestration of GHGs.209 Part C would add new CAA section 721, which sets out annual emission allowances required for specified activities with each allowance representing one ton of CO2e.210 But, new CAA section 722(b)(5) would provide an offset for each ton of CO2e sequestered in a geologic site,211 and new CAA section 722(d) would provide for offsets for approved international GHG reductions found in new CAA section 728.212 New CAA section 734(b)(2)(G) would identify geologic sequestration as a project eligible to generate offset credits.213 A project that receives offset credits would have to report any release of GHGs214 and the project would be subject to requirements for addressing reversals that EPA must promulgate.215 Such projects would be subject to audits and reviews by new CAA section 739 and the verification requirements found in new CAA section 758.216 Emissions in excess of CO2e allowances would be prohibited by new CAA section 722 and are enforced using excess emission penalties found in new CAA section 723.217 Allowance trading, banking, and borrowing would be allowed by new CAA sections 724 and 725.218 Petroleum fuels and products are to be regulated by requiring allowances to be held by the refiners.219 New CAA sections 733 and 753 would provide for offsets for domestic and international emissions reductions.220 St ationary sources that are subject to CAA operating permit requirements will have the applicable American Power Act requirements placed in their permit, which will be enforced in accordance with Title V.221 Title II, Subtitle B, section 2101, deals with the disposition of allowances by creating a Part G in the CAAs Title VII.222 New CAA section 781 would allocate allowances for consumer protection, job protection, clean energy development and deployment (including commercial deployment of carbon capture and sequestration), national and international adaptation efforts, and swapping state allowances for the new federal allowances to reward early action to reduce GHG emissions.223 New CAA sections 790792 would provide an auction procedure for allowances not given away.224 Electricity consumers would be the beneficiaries of 51 of the allowances until 2016 when the percentage becomes 35 and the percentage declines until 2029.225 Natural gas consumers would receive 9 of the allowances in 201 62025 and a declining percentage thereafter.226 Home heating oil consumers would receive 1.9 of the allowances in 2013 through 2015 and a declining percentage thereafter.227 Low-income households will be provided monthly federal benefits through programs found in Title III.228 Energy-intensive, trade-exposed entities are allocated 2 of the allowances in 2013 through 2015, which jumps to 15 from 2016 through 2025 and then slowly decreases.229 A program to improve the energy efficiency of manufacturing plants is also included.230 To facilitate domestic fuel production, allowances are given to refiners.231 For 2013 through 2015, the percentage is 4.3, and in 2016 through 2025 it is 3.75.232 Carbon capture is allocated a percentage of allowances that begins at 0.8 and increases until it reaches 10 in 2030.233 Low Emissions vehicle technology, low-carbon industrial technologies, energy efficiency, and renewable energy are allocated allowances, as are adaptation programs and transportation i nfrastructure and efficiency programs.234 The transportation provisions generally are opposed by highway and transportation officials because they consider the amount of money going to infrastructure development to be inadequate.235 Title II, Subtitle C has programs to control hydrofluorocarbons through modification of CAA Title VI,236 black carbon through modification of the new CAA Title VII,237 and international methane emissions.238 Title II, Subtitle D, aims to prevent the CAA from being used to control GHG except as provided in the American Power Act legislation. It prohibits making GHGs criteria pollutants based on the effects on climate change or ocean acidification.239 It prohibits using standards of performance under CAA section 111 to control climate change effects.240 No GHG may be added to the list of hazardous pollutants or controlled as an international air pollutant under CAA section 115 because of climate change or ocean acidification effects.241 It terminates state run allowance programs242 and limits the use of NSR and operating permits based on emissions of GHGs.243 Title II, Subtitle E regulates GHG markets. Section 2402 gives trading supervision jurisdiction to the Commodities Futures Trading Commission and prohibits exchange trading of GHG futures.244 Subtitle E regulates swap transactions and excessive speculation, and prohibits fraud, certain transactions, and market manipulation.245 It establishes a process for trading GHG instruments.246 Title III deals with consumer protection. Subtitles A and B deal with distributed allowances to electricity, gas, and home heating oil suppliers. Section 3001 creates a CAA Title VII, Part G, which in CAA section 782 specifies how the allowances that are to be distributed to electricity local distribution companies from 2013 through 2029 are to be used to benefit the ratepayers of the companies.247 Section 3101 has similar requirements in a new CAA section 783 for allowances to be distributed to natural gas local distribution companies from 2015 through 2028 for the benefit of retail ratepayers,248 and section 3102 does the same thing for home heating oil and propane customers in a new CAA section 784 that applies from 2013 through 2029. 249 Subtitle C is the working families refundable relief program. Section 3201 establishes a program under the Internal Revenue Code, chapter 1, subchapter A, part IV, subpart C, section 36D.250 The program is to be funded using 2.5 of the annual allowances.251 Eligible households with an income of 150 of the poverty level as specified in section 2110(c)(5) of the Social Security Act252 up to about 38,400 for a family of fourwould receive full benefits and households up to 250 of the poverty levelup to about 64,000 for a family of fourwould receive partial benefits.253 For the first ten years of the program, 2013 through 2022, annual allowances specified in section 2001 (CAA section 721) average a little over 5 billion, so 125 million allowances will be auctioned and the proceeds delivered to recipients that meet the programs qualification requirements.254 Section 2001, CAA section 726, has a cost containment program to limit the cost of each allowance to 25 in 2009 dollars, which increases each year after 2013 by 5 plus the rate of inflation.255 Thi s would cap the payments to households with incomes of up to 250 of the poverty level to about 3.125 billion a year.256 For households that meet the poverty criteria for the working families relief program, sections 32033207 create an Energy Refund Program that amends the Social Security Act to provide monthly cash payments to eligible recipients.257 This would be funded with the proceeds from 12.5 of the emission allowances.258 Using the same calculations as above, this would provide welfare payments capped at about 15.625 billion a year. This program would be administered by the states.259 Section 3206 establishes a Universal Trust Fund to hold the auction proceeds after calendar year 2026, with 25 of the fund to be used for deficit reduction and 75 to be used for the universal refund as specified in section 3207.260 Title IV provides for a few billion dollars a year to be given to specified energy intensive U. S. manufacturing and mining businesses to compensate for increased energy costs created by enactment of CAA Title VII. It does this in section 4001 which creates a new CAA section 771.261 Free allowances begin in 2013 before the sector has any obligations under the bill and increase from 2016 to 2025 by receiving 15 of the allowances.262 Title IV also seeks to prevent the transfer of GHG producing activities to foreign countries. This bill addresses the concern that H. R. 2454 could violate the World Trade Organization rules and trigger retaliatory sanctions. The Senate bill gives the President the power to decide whether to impose tariffs.263 The process is set out in CAA sections 773 and 774.264 CAA section 775 seeks to promote international agreements to create binding commitments from all major GHG emitting countries to reduce emissions.265 Subtitle B deals with creating clean energy technology-related jobs. Section 4101 provides authority to the Secretary of Education to award grants to develop programs to prepare people for jobs in the fields of clean energy, renewable energy, energy efficiency, climate change mitigation, and climate change adaptation.266 Section 4103 seeks to establish apprentice-training programs for careers in clean energy.267 Part II provides for the development of clean vehicles,268 natural gas-powered vehicles,269 and new emissions standards for heavy duty vehicles (HDVs) and non-road vehicles.270 Sections 41514153 provide a program to encourage biological carbon sequestration by the agriculture sector.271 Title V deals with international climate change activities. Section 5001 sets out a policy in support of international efforts to address the impacts of global climate change.272 This includes a call for the establishment of programs to reduce emissions caused by deforestation.273 Title VI seeks to protect fish, wildlife and plants from the effects of climate change. It provides an outline for the development of federal agency natural resources adaptation plans274 as well as state level natural resources adaptation plans that are to be funded up to 90 by the federal allowance program.275 The cap-and-trade bills appear to have died in the summer of 2010, including the compromise American Power Act. In an attempt to pass some kind of climate change legislation, the previously discussed S.1462, which was approved by the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources in June 2009, was being revived. The Committee was considering adding the contents of a number of relatively non-controversial bills introduced in 2010 to create a bill that would subsidize various energy programs without creating financial disincentives to the use of fossil fuel.276 IV. GHG Control Using The CAA The failure to develop a meaningful program to address climate change either through treaties or new federal legislation has led to a reevaluation of existing law in order to use U. S. environmental laws to force sources of GHGs to reduce their emissions. While existing laws are not the ideal way to control CO2 emissions, EPA is committed to moving forward using the legal tools that are available. A. GHG Emissions Reporting Accurate information concerning GHG emissions is a prerequisite to the development of an effective control program.277 The first step to control CO2 emissions should be to create an accurate emissions inventory that is publicly disclosed in a useful form, such as facility specific, company wide, and source category aggregation of data. Section 1605(b) of the 1992 Energy Policy Act278 has a program to track GHG emissions, but it has weak reporting standards, no verification requirements, and provides no penalties for companies that do not report their data.279 Section 1605(b) requires the DOE to establish guidelines for the voluntary reporting of GHG releases and their annual reduction.280 DOE issued guidelines entitled Guidelines for Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Reporting. 281 This voluntary program evolved into DOEs Climate Vision program.282 EPA administers a similar voluntary program, called Climate Leaders, that collects data on GHG emissions.283 Most of the reporting involved electric power generators and covered nearly six hundred projects to reduce emissions or prevent the release of GHGs.284 The federal voluntary reporting system subsequently began to be supplanted by the Climate Registry, a state-developed program that includes thirty-nine states, five Canadian provinces, two Mexican states, the District of Columbia, and three Native American Tribes.285 EPA also administers a mandatory reporting program found in CAA section 412 that is applicable primarily to twenty-five megawatt or larger electric power plants.286 EPA has developed a comprehensive inventory of environmental data on electric power systems based on information supplied to EPA, the Energy Information Administration, and FERC that is known as the Emissions amp Generation Resource I ntegrated Database.287 The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 (H. R. 2764)288 authorized funding for EPA to finalize a rule for an economy-wide GHG registry by June 26, 2009.289 EPA promulgated a final regulation to implement a mandatory GHG emissions reporting program on October 30, 2009.290 The rule has monitoring, recordkeeping, verification, and reporting requirements for emissions of the GHGs covered by the United Nations FCCC.291 The GHG reporting rule is based on EPAs authority under CAA sections 114 and 208, allowing the Administrator to require information to be supplied for the purposes of carrying out any provision of the CAA.292 The reporting rule became effective on January 1, 2010, with the first reports due on March 31, 2011.293 The rule applies to fossil fuel suppliers, industrial gas suppliers, and direct GHG emitters if they emit 25,000 mt of GHGs or more a year, expressed as CO2e.294 Some facilities in identified categories must report even if emissions are below 25,000 tons of CO2e.295 Facilities within listed categories include elec tric power plants subject to the Acid Rain Program,296 including those owned by the Federal and municipal governments and those located in Indian Country.297 Other facilities within listed categories include aluminum production, cement production, lime manufacturing, soda ash production, petroleum refineries, and pulp and paper manufacturers. 298 Reporting for manufacturers of heavy trucks, motorcycles, and non-road engines and vehicles begins with model year 2011 (MY2011).299 Light-duty vehicles, light-duty trucks, and medium-duty passenger vehicles are not included in this rule, but are included in a proposed light-duty GHG emission control program that will begin with MY2012 vehicles.300 About 10,000 facilities that are responsible for about eighty-five percent of the United States GHG emissions are subject to the reporting requirements, including about 3000 stationary combustion sources, 1108 electric generation facilities, 150 petroleum refineries, and 317 vehicle manufacturers.301 The rule does not apply to a number of sources still being reviewed by EPA.302 On March 23, 2010, EPA proposed three rules requiring GHG reporting by oil and natural gas well operations, carbon sequestration facilities, and facilities that produce or use fluorinated gases, such as hydrofluorocarbons.303 The sequestration reporting requiremen ts apply to CO2 sequestered underground and require reporting of the amount received, the amount injected, and the source of the CO2, if known.304 It requires the development and implementation of a site-specific monitoring, reporting, and verification plan approved by EPA, including a strategy for detecting and quantifying CO2 leakage.305 The cost of monitoring and reporting is estimated by EPA at about 300,000 a year for each site.306 Facilities may cease to report after five consecutive years of emissions below 25,000 mt of CO2e, or after three consecutive years of emissions below 15,000 mt of CO2e, or after the GHG producing operations are shut down.307 EPA will collect the data from facilities in the fifty states, the District of Columbia, the U. S. possessions and territories.308 The federal reports must be submitted electronically, in a format to be specified by the Administrator.309 The 25,000 ton emission threshold for reporting CO2e is equivalent to the emissions from the ener gy used by 2200 homes in a year, or from the combustion of 58,000 barrels of oil, or from the combustion of 131 railroad cars of coal.310 Most commercial buildings will be below the threshold.311 Agricultural sources are exempt except for livestock facilities with manure management systems with emissions that are 25,000 tons of CO2e or more per year.312 In addition, on October 27, 2009, the House and Senate agreed on an EPA fiscal year 2010 appropriations bill that includes a provision exempting livestock operations from the need to report their GHGs.313 On April 12, 2010, EPA proposed reporting requirements for cogeneration units.314 On June 29, 2010, EPA announced a final rule imposing GHG emissions reporting requirements on industrial landfills, industrial wastewater treatment facilities, underground coalmines, and magnesium production facilities emitting more than 25,000 mt of CO2e per year.315 On August 11, 2010, EPA promulgated a proposed rule that would make extensive technical changes and corrections to the GHG reporting rule.316 Because federal efforts were considered inadequate, in 2001 California created its Climate Action Registry, a nonprofit 501(c)(3) organization, as a voluntary GHG reporting mechanism that became a model for other states.317 Thirty-nine states, ten Canadian provinces and two Canadian territories, six Mexican states, the District of Columbia and three American Indian tribes are participating.318 There are fifty-two companies and local governments that have agreed to participate by voluntarily measuring and reporting their GHG emissions.319 The federal GHG reporting rules do not replace reporting requirements that are required by states, but EPA is working with the Climate Registry and Exchange Network to harmonize the reporting requirements of the various data generating programs.320 The Western Climate Initiative (WCI) called for more stringent requirements,321 but on June 2, 2010, WCI proposed a reporting rule for its members that w ould be consistent with EPAs mandatory reporting rule while requiring additional recordkeeping and monitoring that will be needed to operate a cap-and-trade program.322 Ultimately, each state will have to decide whether it wishes to impose more stringent reporting requirements than are imposed by EPA. The state of Washington, for example, has a 10,000 tones per year (tpy) trigger applicable to indirect emissions, as well as sources not covered by the federal rule.323 The GHG reporting rule is the subject of a lawsuit filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit by industry trade associations whose primary concern is that the rule does not adequately protect confidential business information.324 B. GHGs and the CAA Since the late 1980s, the United States made minor efforts to control emissions of GHGs, but no federal program imposed binding requirements or enforceable mandates to reduce GHGs until 2010. Congress considered and rejected regulating CO2 emissions, as well as other GHGs, in the process of enacting the 1990 CAA Amendments.325 But, the legislative history became irrelevant after the United States Supreme Court ruled in Massachusetts v. U. S. Environmental Protection Agency ( Massachusetts v. EPA )326 that GHGs are pollutants under the CAA .327 That case began on October 20, 1999, when the International Center for Technology Assessment (ICTA) and about twenty other environmental and renewable energy industry organizations filed a petition to compel EPA to regulate emissions of GHGs from motor vehicles pursuant to section 202(a)(1) of the CAA, which was denied by EPA.328 EPAs administrative denial of the ICTA petition was challenged in a lawsuit filed in the D. C. Circuit on July 15, 2005, that resulted in EPAs position being upheld by a divided court.329 The case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court where the Court addressed two questions concerning the meaning of CAA section 202(a)(1): whether EPA has the statutory authority to regulate GHG emissions from new motor vehicles and if so, whether its stated reasons for refusing to do so are consistent with the statute.330 In a 5 to 4 decision, written by Justice Stevens, in which Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined, the Court ruled that the petit ioners had standing.331 The Court then held that GHGs are physical and chemical substances that are emitted into the air and qualify as air pollutants based on the definition provided in CAA section 302(g).332 It addressed the issue of whether EPA properly refused to exercise its authority to regulate GHGs under section 202(a)(1) by ruling that EPA can avoid taking further action only if it determines that GHGs do not contribute to climate change or if it provides some reasonable explanation as to why it cannot or will not exercise its discretion to determine whether they do.333 The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision and remanded the case to EPA for additional proceedings, however it did not say whether EPA must make an endangerment finding, and it did not articulate what policy concerns may be considered by EPA in making its finding.334 EPA subsequently promulgated an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on July 30, 2008, in which EPA effectively decided not to regu late GHGs at that time, and commenced a lengthy regulatory process that precluded a decision being made before President Obamas Administration occupied the White House. 335 On April 17, 2009, the Administrator made a proposed endangerment finding that six GHGs are air pollutants that may be reasonably anticipated to endanger public health and welfare, and four of themCO2, methane, NOx and hydrofluorocarbonsare emitted from new automobiles, which would allow their regulation under CAA section 202.336 On September 28, 2009, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and EPA each proposed rules to control GHG emissions from passenger cars, light-duty trucks, and medium-duty passenger vehicles.337 EPA would limit CO2 emissions, and the United States Department of Transportation (DOT) would adopt Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards for model years beginning in 2012.338 EPAs GHG controls for light-duty vehicles could not be finalized until the Agency made an endangerment finding. On December 15, 2009, EPA promulgated a final rule saying GHG emissions contribute to GHG pollution, which threatens public health and welfare.339 This allowed EPAs light-duty vehicle CO2 standard to be finalized, which would make CO2 a regulated pollutant. By mid-January 2010 sixteen lawsuits had been filed in the D. C. Circuit challenging the endangerment finding.340 Petitioners included three states, twelve Republican members of Congress, and many industry trade organizations.341 The court postponed the case to allow EPA to respond to ten administrative petitions that were filed with EPA.342 The Agency denied the petitions for review, and on August 13, 2020, the United States Chamber of Commerce filed a suit with the D. C. Circuit challenging the legality of EPAs rejection of the administrative petition.343 On January 21, 2010, Senator Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska) introduced a resolution seeking to nullify EPAs endangerment finding.344 She had substantial Republican support, but needed to obtain support from Democrats if she was to achieve the necessary 51 votes.345 On February 2, 2010, Representative Ike Skelton (D-Mo.) introduced H. R. 4572 to repeal EPAs authority to regulate GHG emissions under the CAA.346 In June 2010, Senator Murkowski s resolution was rejected by the Senate in a 53 to 47 vote, although six Democrats supported the resolution.347 Subsequently, Senator Jay Rockefeller (D-W. Va.) introduced S. 3072 to delay regulation of CO2 from power plants and other stationary sources, and it attracted Democratic support.348 On May 7, 2010, EPA and DOTs NHTSA promulgated their joint final rule to regulate GHG emissions from light-duty vehicles, as well as new fuel economy requirements.349 This rule makes CO2 a regulated pollutant, which triggers the applicability of many other sections of the CAA. This means that carbon sources, such as fossil-fueled electric power plants, are now subject to regulation to control CO2 emissions, which is discussed below. C. CO2 as a Criteria Pollutant Conventional pollutants have been regulated by command and control measures since the CAA was created. For common pollutants released in large quantitiesprimarily from the combustion of fossil fuels350 EPA regulates ambient air concentrations of six pollutants through its national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) as part of its criteria pollutant control program.351 Each state creates a state implementation plan (SIP) to control emission sources in order to reach the ambient levels of pollution set out in the applicable NAAQS.352 This is supplemented by technology-based requirements that are imposed on various sources.353 Under CAA section 108(a) the Administrator must list air pollutants which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.354 After listing a pollutant, CAA section 109(a)(2) requires the Administrator to issue an air criteria document within twelve months, and simultaneously publish a proposed primary and secondary air quality standard.355 Primary standards are to protect public health, whereas secondary standards are to protect public welfare. 356 No existing criteria pollutant has been designated solely because of its impact on public welfare. It is not clear from the wording of section 109 that the Administrator could promulgate a criteria pollutant standard for a pollutant that adversely affected human welfare but did not adversely affect public health. CO2 does not adversely affect human health directly at the concentrations found in the atmosphere,357 but that does not prevent EPA from making a determination that it does. If EPA is to regulate CO2, it will be difficult to develop a viable program using the SIP process,358 because ambient troposphere levels of CO2 essentially are the same everywhere in the world.359 Moreover, the United States is responsible for only about twenty percent of the worlds anthropogenic GHG emissions and the percentage is declining as developing nations increase their utilization of fossil energy.360 If EPA adopted a criteria pollutant approach to control CO2, it would have to set atmospheric numerical values that are either above or below present values. If CO2 NAAQS values were below present CO2 atmospheric concentration, the entire country would have a nonattainment status with no realistic expectation that any measure taken as part of a SIP would lead to attainment of the standard. If a NAAQS value above the present CO2 atmospheric concentration was selected, the entire nation would be in attainment, and significant effort to reduce CO2 would not be needed. Major new or modified sources would be required to participate in an expensive and time-consuming prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) program361 with no realistic expectation of improving the atmospheric concentration of CO2. Nevertheless, some environmental organizations have moved to have CO2 declared a criteria pollutant. 362 Even if EPA does not make CO2 a criteria pollutant, sources of CO2 can expect to have new emission restrictions in order to meet the requirements of a SIP revision because of more stringent criteria pollutant standards for ozone and nitrogen dioxide. Moreover, as of 2009, thirty-seven states had failed to submit SIP revisions to comply with EPAs haze reduction requirements, and EPA plans to issue a federal implementation plan for states that fail to comply by January 15, 2011.363 On June 2, 2010, EPA announced it was setting a one-hour SO2 standard of 75 parts per billion using a three-year average of the 99th percentile of annual distribution of the daily maximum concentrations.364 This change represents a significant tightening of the standard and will add to the costs imposed on coal-fired power plants.365 D. Construction and Operating Permits Proposed new or modified major sources must obtain permits prior to construction.366 In areas that meet the NAAQS for all of the pollutants that the source will emit, the legal requirement is known as a PSD review.367 If the area does not meet the NAAQS for a pollutant that will be emitted, a project is subject to NSR.368 EPA frequently uses NSR to mean both the PSD and NSR programs. Projects must have their environmental impacts assessed as part of a construction permit program.369 The PSD process includes determining the appropriate technology to require an applicant to use in order to comply with the CAA section 165(a)(4) requirement to use the best available control technology (BACT), which as defined in CAA section 169(3) requires consideration of economic impacts and costs.370 In nonattainment areas, CAA section 173(a)(2) requires the lowest achievable emission rate (LAER) to be achieved.371 EPA usually uses a top-down analysis for determining what BACTLAER is.372 The primary guidance is EPAs 1990 New Source Review Workshop Manual.373 Determining the appropriate technology requires considering process changes, fuel substitution, add-on controls and any other available methods to obtain the maximum degree of emission reduction.374 The process begins with requiring the application of the new source performance standards (NSPS), but it is site specific, which al lows the permitting authority to impose more stringent standards.375 New and modified major stationary sources would have to meet the BACTLAER requirements required by CAA sectionis 165(a)(4) and 173(a)(2). However, there is no technology that meets the BACTLAER definitions found in CAA sections 169(3) and 171(3).376 The PSD process, if applicable, applies to each pollutant subject to regulation under the CAA emitted from, or which results from, such facility.377 In nonattainment areas a new or modified major source must control any pollutant that is subject to a NSPS.378 The NSPS for an industrial category applies to any air pollutant.379 Air pollutant is defined broadly in CAA section 302(g).380 PSDNSR requirements are site specific and allow the permitting authority to impose more stringent requirements on a permit applicant than otherwise would be imposed by the CAA.381 States may impose additional standards pursuant to CAA section 116.382 All states have been delegated the authority to run their nonattainment NSR program most states have been delegated the authority to run their PSD programs.383 An issue of concern was whether GHGs that were not regulated, but could be regulated, wer e subject to Federal PSDNSR requirements, which is an issue the Supreme Courts April 2, 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA did not answer.384 EPAs position prior to 2009 was that CO2impacts did not have to be considered as part of the NSR permit process because it was not yet a regulated pollutant.385 But, EPAs Environmental Appeals Board (EAB) did not always concur. On August 30, 2007, EPAs Region 8 issued a PSD permit to the Deseret Power Electric Cooperatives proposed new facility near Bonanza, Utah, despite its potential for increasing CO2 emissions.386 The permit did not include BACT limits for CO2.387 The decision was challenged by the Sierra Club in In re Deseret Power Electric Cooperative .388 On November 13, 2008, EAB remanded the permit to the Region to reconsider whether or not to impose a CO2 BACT limit based on the subject to regulation definition in the CAA and for the Region to develop an adequate record for its decision.389 In another case, In re Northern Michigan University Ripley Heating Plant ,390 EAB directed the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality to review a permit for a new power plant at Northern Michigan University to determine whether GHGs should be regulated on February 18, 2010.391 However, on April 28, 2010, the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality approved an expansion of the Coleto Creek Power Station wi thout sufficiently considering GHG issues.392 On December 18, 2008, EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson issued a memorandum setting forth EPAs interpretation regarding which pollutants were subject to regulation for the purposes of the Federal PSD permitting program.393 The memorandum defines regulated NSR pollutant as including pollutants subject to a provision in the Act or regulation adopted by EPA under the Act that requires actual control of emissions of that pollutant, while excluding pollutants for which EPA regulations only require monitoring or reporting.394 The memorandum provides EPAs interpretation of CAA sections 165(a)(4) and 169(3), which use language similar to the EPA regulations. On December 31, 2008, EPA issued an interpretive memorandum clarifying the December 18th memorandum explaining that pollutants for which only monitoring or reporting are required are not regulated pollutants.395 On February 17, 2009, EPA granted a Petition for Reconsideration and announced its intent to conduct a rulemaking to allow for public comment on the issues raised in the Interpretive Memorandum and on any issues raised by EABs Deseret opinion.396 On May 25, 2010, the Court of Appeals of Virginia upheld a PSD permit issued to Virginia Electric and Power Company for a coal-fired electric generating plant that did not impose CO2 requirements based on the position of EPA concerning what is a regulated pollutant.397 On September 28, 2009, the NHTSA and EPA each proposed rules to control GHG emissions from passenger cars, light-duty trucks, and medium-duty passenger vehicles that would reduce GHGs and improve fuel economy from motor vehicles. 398 EPAs rule to control GHGs from light-duty vehicles could not be finalized until the Agency made its proposed endangerment finding final. 399 On December 15, 2009, EPA promulgated an endangerment finding that CO2, methane, NOx, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride in the atmosphere threaten public health and welfare.400 On May 7, 2010, EPA and NHTSA published a joint final rule to control GHG emissions from light-duty vehicles.401 Now that GHGs are regulated pollutants under the CAA, they will be subject to regulation under many provisions of the CAA, including the CAAs PSDNSR requirements.402 This led to at least seventeen petitions for review in the D. C. Circuit challenging the light-duty GHG vehicle rule.403 On April 2, 2010, EPA promulgated its regulatory interpretation concerning the pollutants covered by the CAA.404 EPA decided to continue applying the Agencys existing interpretation of 40 C. F.R. 52.21(b)(50) found in the PSD Interpretive Memo.405 However, EPA refined its interpretation of 40 C. F.R. 52.21(b)(50) and the parallel provision in 40 C. F.R. section 51.166(b)(49) to establish that PSD permitting requirements apply to a newly regulated pollutant at the time a regulatory requirement to control emissions of that pollutant takes effect, rather than upon promulgation or the legal effective date of the regulation.406 EPA also addressed several outstanding questions regarding the applicability of the PSD and Title V permitting programs to GHGs.407 The emissions control requirements in the rule for mobile sources require compliance through vehicular certification before introducing any MY2012 vehicles into commerce.408 EPA concluded PSD program requirements and other stationary source requirements apply to GHGs upon the date that the tailpipe standards for the MY2012 light-duty vehicles take effect, which EPA ruled is January 2, 2011.409 By June 2010 there were at least fourteen lawsuits challenging EPAs scheduling rule.410 The onset of the BACT requirement is not to be delayed in order for technology or control strategies to be d eveloped. EPA will continue to interpret the definition of regulated NSR pollutant in 40 C. F.R. section 52.21(b)(50) to exclude pollutants, which only require monitoring or reporting, but to include each pollutant subject to either a CAA provision or promulgated regulation that requires actual control of emissions of that pollutant. EPAin its April 2, 2010, interpretationmade it clear that provisions in a SIP regulating a pollutant do not make it a nationally regulated pollutant under the CAA,411 which could trigger the need for compliance with other provisions of the CAA. On April 2, 2010, mining and agricultural groups challenged the mobile source regulation claiming that regulating mobile sources should not automatically lead to regulation of stationary sources under other sections of the CAA.412 Because of the large quantities of CO2 emitted by stationary sources, industry is concerned that if GHGs are regulated the threshold amounts of CO2 necessary to trigger the applicability of the PSD or nonattainment program will be reached by 1,000,000 commercial buildings, 200,000 manufacturing operations, and 20,000 large farms, rather than the 150,000 stationary sources presently subject to regulation.413 The threshold for the PSD program under section 169(1) of the CAA is 100 or 250 tpy of a pollutant, depending on the industry classification.414 In nonattainment areas, the statutory threshold under CAA sections 302(j) and 181187 is at least 100 tpy and sometimes is less.415 A farm with 25 dairy cows or 200 hogs can release 100 tpy of CO2e,416 and even if it was not new or modified so as to trigger NSR, it would be a major source subject to CAA Subchapter Vs operating permit requirements.417 The operating permit requires a minimum fee of 25 per ton, so a small farm that emits 100 tpy would have to pay 2500 per year.418 It is expected that industries will challenge the rule because EPA failed to consider the impact on small businesses as required under the Regulatory Flexibility Act.419 The PSD program also could apply to new gas-fired peaking facilities, which will adversely impact the development of renewable energy because wind and solar facilities need backup electric power.420 When combusted, a gallon of gasoline combines with the oxygen in the air to produce about twenty pounds of CO2.421 Therefore, the PSD threshold may be triggered by using about 5000 gallons of fuel a year, equivalent to 100 tpy of CO2 in a nonattainment area less combusted fuel is needed to trigger the programs applicability. To cope with the potentially large number of new permits that would be needed to regulate GHG emissions, EPA promulgated a proposed rule on October 27, 2009, called the Tailoring Rule, to modify the regulations applicable to the PSD program and the Subchapter V operating permit program.422 The Agency proposed to limit the applicability of PSD requirements to new sources emitting 25,000 tons or more of CO2e for the first six years of the program.423 The rule would impose PSD permit requirements on existing sources making modifications between 10,000 and 25,000 tpy of CO2e, with the exact significance level to be determined after public comment.424 It is not expected that the NSR program will apply to GHG emissions because there is no NAAQS for any GHG, therefore there can be no GHG nonattainment areas.425 The existing PSD program issues 280 permits a year,426 whereas unless EPA limits its permit obligations for sources of GHG emissions, EPA and the states could be required to handle per mit applications from 41,000 new and modified facilities in 2010,427 and one year after GHG regulations for mobile sources are promulgated, six million sources would be required to submit CAA Subchapter V operating permit applications.428 These permits would need to be issued within eighteen months after receipt of a complete application.429 In addition, GHG limitations would need to be added to the existing 14,700 Subchapter V permits.430 For this reason, states urged EPA to delay implementation of its proposed Tailoring Rule.431 EPAs effort to limit the number of potential permits using the proposed Tailoring Rule would not affect states that have PSD programs that are part of an approved SIP. They must continue to use the 100250 tpy threshold trigger until a SIP revision is approved. Under the CAAs 100250 tpy trigger, existing sources would be subject to permit requirements for any increase in emissions because there is no regulatory significance level, thus any increase is considered significant.432 On June 3, 2010, EPA promulgated its final tailoring rule.433 EPA has decided to subject GHG sources to the PSD permitting program in three steps. Beginning January 2, 2011, sources currently subject to the PSD permitting process will require compliance with the program if they are new or are modified to increase emissions above existing significance levels and have total GHG emissions of 75,000 tpy CO2e.434 No sources will be subject to CAA permitting requirements solely due to GHG emissions until July 1, 2011.435 The second step begins July 1, 2011, and runs until July 1, 2013.436 PSD permitting requirements will apply to new construction with GHG emissions of at least 100,000 tpy, even if they do not exceed the permit threshold for other pollutants.437 For existing sources, modification will trigger PSD requirements if they emit 75,000 tpy of GHGs, even if they do not significantly increase emissions of other pollutants.438 For facilities that are subject to operating permit requirements, CO2e requirements will be added.439 Facilities that do not have an operating permit will be required to obtain one if emissions exceed 100,0 00 tpy of CO2e.440 The third step involves another rulemaking to conclude by July 1, 2012.441 EPA must now develop guidance concerning what is BACT for sources of GHG emissions. EPAs efforts may not survive judicial review because they conflict with CAAs section 502, which imposes a 100 tpy trigger for Title V permitting and the PSD programs section 169(a) that defines major emitting facility as a 100 or 250 tpy source.442 While EPA has acted to regulate GHGs as pollutants under the CAA, the House of Representatives acted to prevent this from occurring. The ACES Act (H. R. 2454), approved by the House on June 26, 2009, would modify the use of the CAA to regulate GHGs.443 It creates a new Title VIII to the CAA. ACES section 331 creates CAA section 831 that would prohibit GHGs from being added to the list of criteria pollutants.444 CAA section 832 would prohibit the use of CAA section115, which can require states to revise their SIPs when a pollutant is found to endanger public health or welfare in a foreign country, to control pollutants based on their contribution to global warming.445 CAA section 833 would prohibit regulating GHGs as hazardpis aor pollutants (HAPs) unless the substance meets the criteria for listing independent of its effects on global climate change.446 CAA section 834 would say that Part Cs NSR is not triggered by the release of a GHG.447 CAA section 835 would say that there is no need for a Title V operating permit for a source of GHGs that is based solely on the emissions of a GHG.448 To control GHG emissions, H. R. 2454 proposed CAA section 811 would allow regulation under the CAA section 111 NSPS, as well as the regulation of existing sources based on CAA section 111(d ) to control GHG emissions.449 However, sources subject to cap-and-trade will continue to be subject to NSPS for their non-GHG emissions, but will not be subject to NSPS for capped GHG emissions.450 H. R. 2454 generally focuses its cap-and-trade program on GHG sources with emissions greater than 25,000 tpy of CO2e, but its NSPS provision targets sources with 10,000 tpy to 25,000 tpy of CO2e, which could expose millions of businesses to the need to comply with NSPS.451 This could lead to GHG emission standards for small sources that are more stringent than the standards applicable to large sources. To obtain a preconstruction PSDNSR permit, CAA sections 165(a)(2) and 173(a)(5) require an analysis of alternative sites, sizes, production processes, and environmental control techniques for the proposed source that demonstrates the benefits significantly outweigh the environmental and social costs that are imposed by construction or modification.452 The extent to which alternative analysis can be used to require an alternative be adopted is not clear,453 and this ambiguity is likely to be the subject of challenges to permit applications. If an alternative analysis is to be used to stop a project, who will have the power to determine the social values that are to be considered and how these values are to be balanced These requirements have not been controversial and the scope of this authority has not been the subject of litigation, but if the CAA becomes the basis for a national energy policy and carbon-based energy is to be rationed this requirement is likely to become very controversial. Court decisions have held that BACTLAER requirements cannot be used to force an applicant to redesign a proposed facility.454 Thus, BACTLAER cannot be defined to force a proposed coal-burning plant to use alternative energy, gas, or nuclear power. On August 24, 2006, EAB ruled the Agency could not require the use of low sulfur coal at Peabody Energys Prairie State proposed facility in Illinois because it would redefine the basic design of the facility, which was planned as a mine-mouth facility that would burn high-sulfur Illinois coal.455 Subsequently, in Sierra Club v. U. S. Environmental Protection Agency ,456 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that EPA does not have to consider whether the applicant should use low-sulfur coal as a pollution control technology because such a requirement would require significant modifications of the plant.457 This case is considered an important precedent for the principle that BACT review cannot be used to require a redesign of a proposed facility. With about 153 new coal-fired plants being proposed in forty-two states,458 an important issue is whether integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) can be mandated by the government as the BACT. IGCC is required for a PSD construction permit by CAA section 165(a)(4) or the LAER that is required in nonattainment areas by CAA section 173(a)(2). Is IGCC a pollution control technology that may be required as BACTLAER or is IGCC a different electric power generating technology that cannot be imposed by a permitting authority In the IGCC process, coal of any quality is fed to a gasifier where it is partly oxidized by steam under pressure.459 By reducing the oxygen in the gasifier, the carbon in the fuel is converted to a gas that is eighty-five percent carbon monoxide and hydrogen.460 Hydrogen sulfide is separated from CO2 prior to combustion.461 Sulfur can be removed as elemental sulfur or sulfuric acid and sold.462 Inorganic ash and metals drop out as slag, which is stable and may be used in construction materials.463 The process also can be used to provide process or heating steam, which further increases overall efficiency.464 It has been argued that IGCC is BACT even though it is a different production process and is not an end of stack control.465 This position is supported by the language of CAA section 169(3), which inclu des different production processes, fuel cleaning, and innovative fuel combustion processes as BACT options.466 EPAs 1990 draft guidance indicated that it was not the Agencys general policy to redefine an applicants design for a facility for the purpose of considering what is available technology.467 In the Energy Policy Act of 2005,468 Congress stated that it was taking no position as to whether IGCC was adequately demonstrated for purposes of CAA section 111 or whether it is achievable for the purposes of CAA sections 169 or 171.469 EPAs Stephen D. Page, however, in a letter dated December 23, 2005, stated that IGCC is not BACT because it involves the basic design of a proposed source.470 EPAs position was that CAA section 165(a)(2) requires alternative sources to be considered at an early stage in the permitting process, but once a technology is selected, CAA section 165(a)(4) requires air pollution control requirements to be based on controls that are appropriate for that technolog y as IGCC is considered by EPA to be a technology for generating electricity, not an air pollution control technology.471 The Desert Rock coal-fired power plant is located on Navajo tribal land in northwest New Mexico, and it needs an EPA construction permit.472 On January 22, 2009, EAB agreed to hear the permit application that was challenged by states and environmentalists, but on April 27, 2009, EPA asked EAB to remand In Re Desert Rock Energy Company ,473 in order for the Agency to review the policy of whether IGCC technology is BACT.474 In Georgia, a state court in Friends of the Chattahoochee, Inc. v. Couch 475 decided an appeal from a state administrative law judge that awarded a construction permit to a coal-fired power plant. The court remanded the case to the agency, finding that CO2 emissions are subject to BACT requirements.476 The case, now designated Longleaf Energy Associates, Inc. v. Friends of the Chattahoochee, Inc. ,477 was appealed to the Georgia Court of Appeals. On July 7, 2009, the court reversed the lower court, holding that CO2 does not have to be regulated and IGCC technology does not have to be considered as part of a BACT analysis.478 The case was appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court, but it denied certiorari on September 28, 2009.479 The plant received its final permits from Georgias Environmental Protection Division on April 9, 2010.480 In Texas a proposed 800-megawatt pulverized coal power plant was the subject of a challenge by environmentalists because it did not plan to use IGCC technology. On January 29, 2009, a Texas state appeals court ruled in Blue Skies Alliance v. Texas Environmental Quality Commission 481 that IGCC is not a viable control technology for a conventional pulverized coal plant.482 On December 15, 2009, EPA sent the operating permit for the proposed John Turk power plant in Arkansas back to the state regulators because they improperly rejected IGCC technology when the agency established BACT requirements.483 Also, on December 15, 2009, EPA held the operating permit for the Cash Creek Generating Station in Kentucky was flawed because the state regulators failed to consider natural gas as an alternative to IGCC.484 The uncertainties surrounding the construction permit process and the time required to obtain a permit allows intervenors to extract significant concessions from permit applicants in return for dropping a challenge. For example, as part of a TXU buyout, on February 26, 2007, environmentalists announced a nonbinding agreement that eight of eleven proposed coal-fired power plants in Texas would not be built.485 The company also agreed to expand wind generation and invest 400 million in energy efficiency measures.486 A number of other permit applications show that the requirements to obtain a construction permit is uncertain in this fast changing regulatory environment and permit applicants may be required to make costly concessions to obtain a permit.487 The electric power industry may be giving up their efforts to permit new coal-fired power plants. On July 9, 2009, Intermountain Power announced it would allow its permit to build a new plant in Utah to expire.488 On December 17, 2009, Seminole Electric announced it was withdrawing its application for a construction permit to build a coal-fired power plant in Florida after three administrative challenges.489 Environmentalists claim plans for 100 new coal-fired plants have been shelved in the United States since 2001.490 However, environmentalists and states have had only mixed success using NSR to force electric utilities to upgrade their facilities.491 Environmental organizations have had considerable success at preventing new facilities from being constructed. By 2007 at least fifty-nine proposed coal-burning power plants had been cancelled, abandoned, or put on hold, and in 2008 an additional nineteen proposals were cancelled, abandoned, or put on hold.492 In 2009 at least twenty-one plants were added to the list of proposed plants that are unlikely to be constructed.493 But, in an effort to control existing sources, environmental organizations are now using the operating permit requirements in Subchapter V of the CAA as the basis for challenging the renewal of operating permits granted by the states and seek to enforce the provisions of existing operating permits.494 This includes efforts to require compliance schedules in operating permits. In 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a facilitys CAA Subchapter V operating permit must include a compliance schedule to address a formal enforcement complaint and enforcement action brought by the state.495 In 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, and in 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, ruled against the Sierra Club on this issue, creating a split among the circuits.496 EPA is also beginning to use enforcement to limit GHGs. For example, on February 4, 2010, EPA announced a consent decree with Conoco-Phillips to have methane controls at natural gas compressor stations and at wellheads.497 Now that EPAs GHG rule for mobile sources is finalized, operating permits will be required to consider CO2 emissions during the permitting process. This will require states to process a massive increase in first-time permit applications and renewal applications.498 In EPAs Tailoring Rule, issued June 3, 2010, the agency plans to limit operating permit requirements to new sources of 75,000 tpy or more of CO2e and existing sources not yet holding a Subchapter V permit that emit 100,000 tpy and plan to increase emissions of CO2e by 75,000 tpy.499 Pursuant to CAA section 503(c), an owner or operator of an existing major source has twelve months to submit a Subchapter V application if the source is not already a permit holder.500 Because the GHG requirements do not become applicable until January 2011, the applications would not be required until January 2012.501 Environmentalists are also beginning to look at the best available retrofit technology permit requirements for protecting visibility in pristine areas as a potential litigation tool.502 E. NSPS and HAPs The CAA has two federal programs that provide for emission standards to be established through regulations promulgated for industrial categories. EPA imposes NSPS based on CAA section 111503 and regulates HAPs based on CAA section 112.504 There is no emissions threshold in CAA section 111,505 therefore, almost all changes to existing facilities potentially could trigger NSPS applicability, although the absence of cost effective control technology would hamper the use of this section. In addition, unlike other sections of the CAA, section 111(b)(1) requires an air pollutant to significantly contribute to endangerment of public health or welfare.506 It is not clear how much discretion the term significantly provides EPA. EPA could also try to regulate CO2 emitted by existing sources using section 111(d), but this would not appear to provide any relief from the problems already discussed. If EPA designates CO2 as either a criteria pollutant or a HAP then section 111(d) may not be utilized.507 The Agency is scheduled to propose numerous NSPS-based regulations because section 111(b)(1)(B) requires EPA to review NSPS every eight years.508 These regulatory actions are subject to pressure from environmental groups to include controls on GHG emissions. If EPA decides not to regulate them, litigation is likely.509 EPA was under a court order to promulgate a final NSPS for refineries, and a final rule was published June 24, 2008,510 but the rule does not establish standards for CO2 emissions.511 EPA rejected consideration of GHG limits in proposed NSPS for Portland cement facilities on May 30, 2008.512 Now that CO2 is a regulated pollutant, it will be difficult for the Agency to avoid adding CO2 requirements to NSPS. The CAA regulates HAPs by limiting emissions using technology-based requirements pursuant to section 112. Section 112(b)(1) lists 189 hazardous pollutants for potential regulation CO2 is not on the list.513 Section 112(b)(2) requires the health effects to come from inhalation or other routes of exposure and then goes on to list effects such as carcinogenicity.514 These health effects are all the result of direct exposure. Any health effects from climate change, whether or not caused by increases in atmospheric CO2 concentrations, are indirect effects, such as diseases spread by insect populations that increase due to higher temperatures.515 This differs from the direct harm caused by the listed substances regulated pursuant to section 112. Furthermore, when section 112 discusses adverse environmental effects as a basis for regulating a substance, the language whether through ambient concentrations, bioaccumulation, deposition, or otherwise indicates a concern with the direct harmful effects of a substance.516 HAPs are those substances that pose serious health risks.517 While EPA is given some flexibility in making decisions on the frontiers of scientific knowledge, case law requires a rational basis for a decision to designate a pollutant as hazardous.518 There is not a rational basis for EPA to designate CO2 as hazardous. None of the section 112 HAPs are as ubiquitous in the environment as is CO2. Nevertheless, on December 15, 2009, EPA found that GHGs threaten the public health and welfare and contribute to GHG pollution, which threatens public health and welfare.519 Whether this finding could be used to regulate CO2 under section 112 and whether such an action could survive judicial review is unknown at this time. The HAP control program primarily regulates major stationary sources, which are defined as sources of emissions of 10 tpy of any HAP or 25 tpy of a combination of HAPs.520 If CO2 is designated a HAP, section 112s requirements would be triggered by the emission of 10 tons of CO2 per year. This threshold would be reached by burning about 1000 gallons of petroleum-based fuel521 and would make almost every home in America a hazardous emissions stationary source. This in turn, would require an operating permit to be obtained for nearly every furnace in the country. The administrative headaches associated with such a program would seem to be overwhelming, but some people in industry consider the need for an operating permit to be less onerous than having to comply with NSR requirements.522 If section 112 is used to control CO2 emissions, presumably a technology standard of maximum available control technology (MACT) would need to be established for all industry categories that emit CO2. Whether EPA can change the statutory threshold to a higher number by regulation and whether such a regulation will be upheld by a reviewing court is not known. Even if CO2 is not regulated under section 112, EPA is required to issue a MACT standard for coal - and oil-fired power plants by November 16, 2011,523 to replace the rule vacated by the D. C. Circuit in 2007.524 The regulation is expected to significantly add to the costs being incurred by this industry in order to reduce emissions of mercury and other metals, organics, dioxin, and hydrogen chloride.525 For example, on August 10, 2009, a Virginia state court invalidated a permit for a coal-fired power plant that had been under construction for more than a year because the facilitys mercury emissions were not adequately controlled.526 In addition to costly new regulations under the CAA, EPA is in the process of developing rules to control the over 130 million tons of coal ash generated by the electric power industry each year.527 EPA is attempting to regulate the ash as hazardous waste under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act528 the proposed rule was released in May 2010.529 If f inalized, this rule would add considerable cost to coal-fired power plants and could limit the use of ash by other industries.530 F. Interstate Transport EPA could claim CO2 is primarily an interstate transport problem and regulate it at the federal level. This would be similar to the approach used to regulate SO2found in Subchapter IV of the CAA.531 Such an approach would result in EPA rationing the use of fossil fuel through caps on CO2 emissions. Whether the CAA gives EPA this power would almost certainly have to be determined by the courts. CAA section 126 provides EPA authority to control major sources to prevent releasing air pollution that may significantly contribute to levels of air pollution in excess of NAAQS in another state.532 Air pollutants that are carried beyond a states boundary may be regulated using CAA section 110(k)(5).533 While the SIP process is primarily locally focused and is predicated on the SIP being able to achieve significant reductions of targeted pollutants,534 a revision may be required if the SIP does not adequately deal with air pollutants being transported to a downwind state. EPA promulgated the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) on May 12, 2005.535 CAIR was to replace Subchapter IVs SO2 cap-and-trade program and the SIP Calls NOx trading program.536 It was aimed at twenty-eight eastern states and the District of Columbia.537 This program was to be implemented by states that are assigned tradable emission allowances by EPA, which are allocated to specific power plants by the state.538 An alternative approach would be to regulate GHGs using CAA section115, which deals with international air pollution.539 This provision has not received much attention from EPA although it has been part of the CAA since the 1960s. A CO2 control program based on this provision would not have many of the problems discussed concerning trying to use the CAA to control GHGs because section 115 gives extraordinary discretion to the Administrator. Section 115 was originally included in the 1963 CAA to control interstate air pollution.540 In 1977 the interstate portion of section 115 was removed and the section became an international air pollution provision.541 This rarely utilized section could be an effective tool to use to regulate GHG emissions.542 CAIR was challenged in the D. C. Circuit by North Carolina and by industry plaintiffs.543 North Carolina objected to the regional caps because they did not adequately protect the state from upwind emissions.544 The court considered CAIR to be so flawed that it vacated it and its associated trading program for NOx on July 11, 2008.545 EPA and other parties asked for an en banc hearing, and on November 4, 2008, EPA asked for a stay of the decision until a replacement rule could be drafted.546 On December 23, 2008, the D. C. Circuit granted EPAs petition and remanded the case without vacatur to the Agency to cure the fundamental flaws that were identified by the court in its July 11, 2 008 opinion.547 CAIRs emissions trading program remains in effect and power plants continue to need to hold allowances for their NOx and SO2 emissions.548 An industry concern is that a replacement for CAIR could have a more serious impact on coal-generated electricity than CO2 control.549 On July 6, 2010, EPA proposed the Transport Rule that will replace CAIR when it is finalized.550 The rule will apply to Kansas, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Texas, and twenty-seven states plus the District of Columbia that are to the east.551 It will not apply to Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, or Rhode Island. It requires twenty-eight states to reduce SO2 and NOx in order to help downwind states meet the 24-hour PM2.5 standard.552 It requires twenty-six states to reduce NOx in the summer to help downwind states meet the ozone standard.553 By 2014 power plant emissions of SO2 are to be reduced by 71 from 2005 levels and NOx emissions are to be reduced 52 at an annual cost of 2.8 billion.554 EPA expects to propose more stringent standards in 2011 and finalize them in 2012.555 EPA is proposing several approaches to implement this proposed rule, but its preferred approach is to set pollution limits for each of the thirty-two states and the District of Columbia and allow limited interstate trading among power plants as long as each state stays within its emissions budget.556 EPA is proposing a federal implementation plan to reduce interstate pollution transport, but will allow states to develop state plans to replace the federal plan.557 G. Mobile Source Control CO2, the GHG of primary concern, i s the product of even perfect combustion of any fossil fuel.558 There is no cost-effective technology to prevent CO2 emissions from motor vehicles, and there is no reasonable expectation that it will be developed in the foreseeable future.559 The only way to reduce CO2 emissions from mobile sources is to have the nations vehicle fleet use less fossil fuel.560 Even improved vehicle fuel efficiency, while helpful, will not reduce CO2 emissions if vehicles are driven more miles.561 The transportation sector is the U. S. end-use sector with the second most CO2 releases, accounting for 33.1 of total CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion in 2008.562 Petroleum use is responsible for 98.0 of the sectors CO2 emissions and 58.6 percent of the emissions were from the use of motor vehicle gasoline.563 From 1990 to 2007, CO2 emissions from the transport sector increased 27.3 for an average annual growth of 1.6.564 From 1990 to 2010, population in the United States grew from 250.13 million to 309 .16 million, which is a 23.6 increase, or an annual average increase of about 1.18.565 Thus, a substantial portion of the growth in CO2 emissions from the transportation sector may be attributable to the effects of population growth. In 2007 the United States used 24 of the worlds oil supply but it has only 2 of the worlds petroleum reserves.566 The United States imported 56.9 of its oil in 2008, and transportation was responsible for 69.8 of U. S. petroleum consumption.567 The United States is importing about 3.4 billion barrels of oil a year in 2010.568 With a price of about 79 a barrel at the beginning of August 2010 and about 75 a barrel in September 2010,569 imported petroleum costs United States consumers around 260 billion a year. Reducing carbon emissions from the transportation sector would benefit the economy as well as the environment and would reduce the need to shape foreign policy to support our dependency on imported oil. The U. S. mobile source emissions control program framework was created by the 1970 CAA Amendments.570 From 1970 to 1990, emission standards became more stringent, and the scope of the program expanded, but there was little change in the program to control highway vehicles based on mandated reductions in emissions of hydrofluorocarbons, carbon monoxide, and NOx.571 Section 202(a)(1) of the CAA grants the Administrator of EPA the power to regulate any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare, but this authority is restricted by section 202(a)(3)s provision for heavy-duty trucks.572 Air pollution is defined in CAA section 302(g).573 HDVs manufactured after 1983 are subject to section 202(a)(3)(A), which regulates emissions of hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, NOx, and particulate matter.574 The Administrator may revise heavy-duty tr uck standards, but revisions are limited to changes promulgated under the CAA prior to the CAA Amendments of 1990, except for NOx from model year 1998 heavy-duty trucks.575 GHGs, including CO2, were not regulated prior to 1990 and therefore section 202 appears to preclude their regulation from HDVs. However, the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007576 requires new fuel economy standards to be promulgated for medium - and heavy-duty trucks.577 The power to impose fuel economy standards is effectively the power to regulate CO2 emissions. On May 21, 2010, President Obama directed EPA to begin rulemaking for medium - and heavy-duty trucks to control fuel economy and GHG emissions for MY2014 and beyond.578 For a GHG from most mobile sources to be regulated by the CAA there must be findings that (1) it is a pollutant, (2) it endangers public health or welfare, (3) there is an appropriate control technology, (4) the technology is cost effective, and (5) appropriate time is provided to apply the technology.579 Because the endangerment language also appears in section 211(c),580 in section 213,581 and in section 231,582 the Supreme Courts decision in Massachusetts v. EPA . which declared GHGs to be air pollutants within the meaning of CAA section 302(g) has the potential to affect most of the CAAs Subchapter II, mobile source program.583 EPAs endangerment finding of December 15, 2009, stated that GHG emissions contribute to GHG pollution, which threatens public health and welfare and so meets the second requirement.584 EPA expects to meet the third and fourth requirement using fuel economy standards. 585 Federal fuel economy requirements began with the 1975 Energy and Policy Conservation Act (EPCA).586 Among its provisions were CAFE standards for light-duty vehicles.587 CAFE requirements were 27.5 miles per gallon (mpg) for passenger cars from MY1985 until MY2011 and were 20.7 mpg for light-duty trucks from MY1996 through MY2004.588 CAFE standards for light trucks increased in stringency to 21.0 mpg in MY2005 and further increased to 23.1 mpg in MY2009.589 CAFE requirements for MY2011 light trucks and medium-duty passenger became more stringent with mpg requirements based on vehicle weight.590 The actual fuel economy of U. S. cars and light trucks was 22.1 mpg in 19871988, and it remained relatively constant for a decade because the increasing percentage of light trucks, vans, and sport utility vehicles (SUVs) in the nations vehicle fleet nullified the improved technology used on vehicles.591 CAFE standards for automobiles are more stringent than the standards for light-duty trucks, SUVs, and crossover vehicles, which often have been able to take advantage of the more lenient truck standards. On April 6, 2006, DOT mandated new fuel economy standards for SUVs, pickup trucks, vans, and minivans beginning with MY2008.592 The 2006 rule divides light-duty trucks into six classes according to vehicle size, with each class required to meet a different fuel economy standard.593 Four national environmental organizations, eleven states, the District of Columbia, and New York City challenged NHTSAs Average Fuel Economy Standards for Light Trucks, Model Years 20082011,594 in Center for Biological Diversity v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration .595 The regulation sets standards for light trucks, including SUVs and minivans for MY 20082010, based on the existing CAFE standards.596 For MY2011 and beyond the standards vary depending on the trucks size.597 Petitioners challenged the final rule under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969598 and EPCA.599 Petitioners claimed the rule could lead to increased GHG emissions because the use of vehicle weight classifications ma y encourage manufacturers to build larger, less fuel-efficient vehicles.600 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, on November 15, 2007, after a comprehensive review of CAFE regulation under the 1975 EPCA legislation, held the final rule to be arbitrary and capricious, contrary to EPCA requirements, and held the Environmental Assessment was inadequate.601 It remanded the rule to NHTSA to promulgate new standards as expeditiously as possible and to prepare a full Environmental Impact Statement.602 On August 18, 2008, the Ninth Circuit amended its order so that NHTSA would have to consider the benefits of reducing CO2 emissions, but it only needed to revise its environmental analysis, and so might not have to do a full environmental impact statement.603 More stringent CAFE standards for passenger vehicles were provided in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007.604 Section 102 provides for modest increases in motor vehicle fuel economy to be prescribed by the Secretary of Transportation after consultation with the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of EPA.605 The Act requires a 40 increase in fuel economy from cars and light-duty trucks by 2020.606 On April 22, 2008, DOT proposed new fuel economy standards that are more stringent than those imposed by the 2007 legislation.607 However, before the proposed rule was finalized, President Obama directed NHTSA to issue new MY2011 fuel economy standards.608 On March 30, 2009, NHTSA required MY2011 passenger cars and light-duty trucks to achieve a combined average of 27.3 mpg.609 Passenger cars must meet a standard of 30.2 mpg, which is the first increase since the 27.5 mpg standard was established in 1975.610 For light trucks the MY2011 standard is 24.1 mpg.611 On September 28, 2009, EPA and NHTSA promulgated a proposed rule to regulate CO2emissions and improve fuel economy for passenger cars, light-duty trucks, and medium-duty passenger vehicles.612 On May 7, 2010, EPA and NHTSA promulgate d a final joint rule.613 Vehicles covered by this rule are responsible for almost 60 of the transportation-related GHG emissions.614 This rule is projected to reduce GHGs from the U. S. light-duty fleet by approximately 21 by 2030 from what would occur without this rule.615 An additional goal of the rule is to create a single standard that would be accepted by California and other states that have worked to create more stringent motor vehicle fuel efficiency standards.616 This has been successful and has resulted in the automobile industry dropping lawsuits opposing the California standards and their adoption by thirteen other states.617 However, industry groups are challenging the May 7, 2010 rule in the D. C. Circuit.618 Because emissions of CO2, which are 95 of the GHG emitted from light-duty vehicles, are essentially constant per gallon of a given type of fuel, emission limits for CO2 are effectively the same as fuel efficiency standards. NHTSA and EPA continue to work to develop more stringent fuel economy standards that will be applicable to MY2017 and thereafter vehicles.619 EPA appears to be taking the lead on what is expected to be a single standard.620 EPAs CO2 standards are based on its CAA section 202 authority621 NHTSAs standards are based on its authority under EPCA, as amended by the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007.622 EPAs standards require vehicles to meet an estimated combined average emissions level of 250 gramsmile in MY 2016, which is equivalent to a combined average fuel economy of 35.5 mpg, if the standard is met solely through fuel economy improvements.623 NHTSAs standards would require a combined fuel economy that becomes increasingly stringent from MY2012 until it reaches 34.1 mpg in MY2016, which is an average annual increase in fuel efficiency of 4.3 relative to MY2011 standards.624 Each manufacturer must meet a standard determined using a sales-weighted average for the various passe nger cars and light-duty trucks.625 However, light trucks require a 3.4 annual improvement, while cars must increase fuel efficiency by 4.5 per year.626 While the regulations are designed to impose one set of standards, the fact that they are designed to meet the requirements of different statutes leads to some differences in the requirements imposed by the two agencies.627 Environment Canada subsequently proposed regulations that would limit GHG emissions from new motor vehicles that will harmonize Canadas standards with the new U. S. standards.628 Motor vehicles are not very thermally efficient, but the potential for motor vehicle fuel efficiency improvements by 2015 is only between 10 and 15 a mid-range 12.5 improvement would result in about an 11 CO2 emission reduction.629 Using existing technology, the maximum GHG emissions reduction is about 38 for cars and light-duty trucks and 24 for HDVs.630 Between 1976 and 1989, about 70 of the improvement in fuel economy was due to weight re duction, improvements in transmissions, improved aerodynamics, the use of front wheel drive, and the use of fuel injection.631 These improvements will be nullified if car buyers selected vehicles with enhanced performance or if vehicle miles traveled (VMTs) increase. Improved fuel efficiency also may be nullified if credits for flexible fuel vehicles, advanced technology vehicles, electric vehicles, or other credits are used to allow manufacturers to sell traditional vehicles with high fuel consumption.632 In addition, the method used to calculate the fuel economy of electric and plug-in hybrid vehicles is an unresolved issue because mpg tests do not properly account for the upstream pollution created by the source of the electricity.633 VMTs also increase as a result of population increase. The number of vehicles per thousand people increased by 72.59 per thousand from 1990 to 2007, so about 21.9 million additional vehicles or almost half the growth in the vehicle fleet is due to increases in consumption, but the total number of vehicles increased by 58.26 million between 1990 and 2007,634 so population growth appears to be responsible for more than half this increase. VMT per capita since 1970 have nearly tripled,635 with an average increase of 1.7 a year from 1997 to 2007. 636 To reduce CO2 emissions from the transportation sector requires both technology improvements and changes in the use of transportation. To reduce VMT requires long-term changes in land use and transportation that will be difficult to achieve because of the lack of political support. Moreover, tax benefits including parking as an employee fringe benefit, the home mortgage interest deduction, preferential treatment of the oil and gas industry, and tax deductions for the purchase of large SUVs encourage a petroleum intensive lifestyle.637 There are at least thirty-six vehicles presently being marketed in the United States that achieve thirty-five mpg, or better, based on EPAs highway fuel economy test.638 There are more than thirty-two hybrid models available.639 But not enough of these vehicles are purchased to prevent motor vehicle CO2 emissions from increasing. For the period 1998 to 2008, U. S. petroleum consumption by the transportation sector increased by 0.8 a year.640 This resulted in a 5.56 million gallon per day increase in U. S. transportation fuel consumption in the 1970 to 2008 period.641 However, the cost of gasoline and the poor economy contributed to a 0.63 million barrel per day decrease in transportation petroleum consumption in 2008.642 If we are serious about reducing petroleum demand we need to consider increasing the cost of driving by enacting a carbon tax, increasing gasoline taxes, or using cap-and-trade legislation. Another approach would be to increase the tax benefits for purchasing hybrid vehicles, which is a quick way to lower fossil fuel consumption. The CAA is not a tool designed to deal with GHG emissions, or more specifically CO2. To limit CO2 requires less fossil fuel to be combusted. EPA has neither the mandate nor the ability to be the Czar of energy utilization. To reduce carbon emissions will require expanded use of nuclear power and continued development of alternative renewable energy. Moreover, it will require lifestyle changes involving land use and transportation policy. Such efforts are unlikely to be effective and would carry the EPA well beyond what most people would consider the authority granted by the CAA, and perhaps beyond what many people would consider the appropriate role of the Agency. To stabilize atmospheric concentrations of CO2 will be very difficult in the context of a growing world population and a growing demand for useable energy. Under a business as usual scenario global CO2 emissions could more than double and emissions from coal combustion could more than triple by 2050.643 Whether the worlds emissions of GHGs can be cut to the extent necessary to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of GHGs in half a century while population and consumption increases is unknown. Achieving stabilization will require that growth in primary power consumption come from non-CO2 emitting sources. These include renewable sources (solar, wind, hydroelectric, biofuels), nuclear, and fossil fuel combustion that includes carbon capture and sequestration. No one technology will provide a silver bullet solution to global warming. Rather, a long-term strategy needs to evolve using many approaches. To reduce U. S. CO2 emissions requires consideration of the four major contributing factors: population, per capita GDP, the energy intensity of the economy, and the carbon intensity of the fuel used.644 The population of the United States grew by 0.9 percent in 2009,645 so the other three factors need to be reduced to deal with population growth merely to avoid an increase in emissions. To date, the most aggressive effort to control GHG emissions has been Californias Senate Bill No. 375, enacted in 2008.646 This law is the first U. S. law to require comprehensive land use, transportation, housing, and climate change planning.647 Regulations to implement the legislation were proposed on August 9, 2010.648 The four largest urban areas are to reduce GHG emissions by between 13 and 16 per capita by 2035 and the rest of the state is to reduce GHGs by 1 to 14 by 2035.649 However, Californias population is projected to increase from 38 million to 46 million by 2030, which is a 21.05 population increase five years before S. B. 375 is to a achieve a smaller per capita reduction.650 This is an example of how difficult it will be to reduce GHGs in a world of rapidly increasing population. Because CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion are the dominant source of U. S. GHG emissions,651 a program to deal with climate change needs to focus on fossil fuel use and be tailored to the various sectors of the economy. In the short term, energy conservation measures may provide the best opportunity for meaningful reductions in CO2 emissions. At the same time, the United States should be pursuing a policy of aggressive development of nuclear and alternative energy. Mobile sources need to continue to increase fuel efficiency by using hybrid, plug-in hybrid, electric vehicles, and natural gas-powered vehicles. More use should be made of railroads to carry freight and mass transit to transport people. Encouraging energy conservation and the use of new energy sources requires energy costs to remain as high as or higher than they were in the summer of 2008. If energy costs are allowed to drop, those who invest in a low-carbon energy future may lose their investment and attracting capital for a post-carbon economy will be difficult. Even if investing in low-carbon energy is made attractive, the size of the capital investment required will be a challenge for the capital markets. The best hope for a viable program is that Congress will create an effective new program to reduce our dependence on carbon-based fuels without harming the economy. The pending cap-and-trade legislation, previously discussed, will be unlikely to accomplish this goal. The price of fossil fuel-based energy needs to be increased to represent an approximation of its real cost. But, we do not need a complex trading system run byand manipulated bythe financial services industry. An energy policy should be simple, such as a carbon tax that redistributes the revenue back to the citizens. It should not significantly expand the federal government. It should not be an income redistribution program and should allow the free market to work by creating a level playing field for all energy related technologies to compete. If we are to develop an effective policy to deal with climate change, it will need to protect the planet while providing jobs and expanding our economy. Professor of Law, S. J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah and member of the University of Utahs Institute for Clean amp Secure Energy J. B. and Maurice Shapiro Professor Emeritus of Environmental Law, The George Washington University. The author wishes to express his appreciation for the assistance of Michael and Margaret Stern, to Germaine Leahy, head of reference at the George Washington University Law Library, and to J. D. candidate Emily Lewis. This Article continues the authors decade of coverage of climate change legal developments and deals as briefly as possible with pre-2009 issues discussed in his prior publications. These publications include Electric Power in a Carbon Constrained World . 34 Wm. amp Mary Envtl. L. amp Poly Rev. 821 (2010) Federal Control of Carbon Dioxide Emissions: What Are the Options . 36 B. C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 1 (2009) Controlling Greenhouse Gas Emission From Mobile SourcesMassachusetts v. EPA . 37 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10535 (July 2007) State and Federal Command-and-Control Regulation of Emissions From Fossil-Fuel Electric Power Generating Plants . 32 Envtl. L. 369 (2002) and Global Warming . 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10253 (Mar. 2001). 1 Carbon Dioxide Info. Analysis Ctr. Oak Ridge Natl Lab. Recent Greenhouse Gas Concentrations . cdiac. esd. ornl. govpnscurrentghg. html (last visited Nov. 20, 2010) see also Bert Bolin, The Carbon Cycle . الخيال العلمي. صباحا. Sept. 1970, at 124, 13132 (discussing the historical build up of atmospheric CO2 levels and predicting future increases). 2 Dean Scott, Global Carbon Concentrations Accelerating at Almost Four Times Growth Rate of 1990s . 39 Envt Rep. (BNA) 1967, at 1967 (Oct. 3, 2008). For a discussion of increased CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere, see Leora Fair, Carbon Dioxide, Methane Concentrations Increased in 2007, NOAA Index Shows . 39 Envt Rep. (BNA) 853, at 853 (May 2, 2008). 3 Scott, supra note 2, at 1967. 4 See, e. g. . F. Sherwood Rowland, Atmospheric Changes Caused by Human Activities: From Science to Regulation . 27 Ecology L. Q. 1261, 1287 (2001) (explaining how greenhouse gases (GHGs) cause temperature increases). 5 U. S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Inventory of U. S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2008, at 5-3 (2010), available at epa. govclimatechangeemissionsdownloads10 11 Id. at ES-4, tbl. ES-2 (value calculated from tbl. ES-2). (12) إد. at ES-4, tbl. ES-2 (values calculated from tbl. ES-2). The 100 largest U. S. electric power producers own about 2200 power plants. They produce 89 of the nations electricity and generate 87 of the sectors CO2 emissions. Christopher Van Atten et al. Benchmarking Air Emissions of the 100 Largest Electric Power Producers in the United States 1, 3 (June 2010), available at nrdc. orgairpollutionbenchmarking2008benchmark2008.pdf. 13 U. S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Climate Change Indicators in the United States 1417 (2010), available at epa. govclimatechangeindicatorspdfsClimateIndicators full. pdf. 14 The material in this Part is a synopsis of material covered in greater detail in Arnold W. Reitze, Jr. Global Warming , 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,253, at 10,25761 (Mar. 2001). 15 Nicholas A. Robinson, Implementing Agenda 21 Internationally Through Environmental Law . in Agenda 21: Earths Action Plan xiv, xxi (Nicholas A. Robinson ed. 1993). 16 See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janiero, Braz. June 314, 1992, Agenda 21 . U. N. Doc. ACONF.15126Rev.1 (Vol. I) Annex II (Jan. 1, 1993), available at un. orgesadsdagenda21. 17 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U. N.T. S. 107 (prescribing the commitments each country will make addressing climate change). 36 See id. arts. 1617. An important part of the Kyoto Protocol is the provisions for market-based mechanisms to reduce the developed nations costs of meeting required emissions reductions. هوية شخصية. art. 6. These flexibility mechanisms allow the transfer of greenhouse emission reduction obligations between nations to encourage reductions where costs are lowest. هوية شخصية. arts. 6, 12, 16. There are three mechanisms: 1) joint implementation, which allows a developed country to sponsor a project in another developed country in return for part, or all, of the emission reduction credit that results from the project 2) the clean development mechanism, which allows a developed country to finance emissions reductions in a developing country that is a Party to the Protocol in exchange for credit for the reduced emissions 3) the international emissions trading system, which allows nations to buy or sell allowances to emit GHGs. هوية شخصية. The details necessary to implement these market mechanisms were left for future clarification. انظر، على سبيل المثال. , Annie Petsonk, The Kyoto Protocol and the WTO: Integrating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Allowance Trading into the Global Marketplace , 10 Duke Envtl. L. amp Poly F. 185, 190 (1999) (noting detailed rules regarding emission units were set to be elaborated and adopted in 2000). 37 See Amy Royden, U. S. Climate Change Policy Under President Clinton: A Look Back , 32 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 415, 455, 458 (2002). 38 See Jonathan Remy Nash, Null Preemption . 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1015, 102122 (2010) (It was with near unanimous senatorial opposition that President Clinton declined to submit the Kyoto Protocol. for ratification. (footnotes omitted)). In July 1997, the United States Senate sent the unanimous Byrd-Hagel resolution to the Clinton Administration that stated the Senate would not ratify a protocol that did not require substantive third world participation or that would damage the U. S. economy. S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) see also Frank H. Murkowski, The Kyoto Protocol Is Not the Answer to Climate Change . 37 Harv. J. on Legis. 345, 35354 (2000) (outlining scope of Byrd-Hagel resolution). On October 20, 1999, President Clinton signed the Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-74, 113 Stat. 1047 (1999), which contains the Knollenberg funding restriction that bars EPA from proposing or issuing rules, regulations, decrees, or orders to implement the Kyoto Protocol. راجع المعرف. at 1080. 39 Mitchell F. Crusto, All That Glitters Is Not Gold: A Congressionally-Driven Global Environmental Policy . 11 Geo. Intl Envtl. L. Rev. 499, 511 (1999). 40 Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, unfccc. intkyotoprotocolstatusofratificationitems2613.php (last visited Nov. 21, 2010). 41 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 28, art. 25. 42 Press Release, European Union, European Union Ratifies the Kyoto Protocol (May 31, 2002), available at europa. eurapidpressReleasesAction. doreferenceIP02794ampformat PDFampaged1amplanguageENampguiLanguageen,. 43 John R. Justus amp Susan R. Fletcher, Cong. Research Serv. IB 89005, Global Climate Change 13 (2006). 44 See Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, Oct. 25Nov. 5, 1999, Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Fifth Session . U. N. Doc. FCCCCOP19996, para. 22 (Dec. 21, 1999), available at ceeindia. orggreenhouse gasesc5.pdf. 45 Jon Hanks et al. Intl Inst. Sustainable Dev. , Summary of the Resumed Sixth Session of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change: 16-27 July, 2001 . 12 Earth Negotiations Bull. July 30, 2001, at 1, 45, available at iisd. ca downloadpdfenb12176e. pdf. 46 Emily Boyd et al. Intl Inst. Sustainable Dev. Summary of the Seventh Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change: 29 October10 November 2001 . 12 Earth Negotiations Bull. Nov. 12, 2001, at 1, available at iisd. ca downloadpdfenb12189e. pdf. The Accords emphasize that the three flexibility mechanismsJI, an emissions trading system, and a CDMdo not create a right, title or entitlement to emit and parties must demonstrate that their use of the mechanisms is supplemental to domestic action, which must be a significant element for meeting each countrys target for emissions reductions. Nevertheless, the Accords do not impose limits on the extent to which the flexibility mechanisms can be used to meet emissions targets. Climate Change Secretariat, A Guide to the Climate Change Convention and its Kyoto Protocol, 27 (2002), available at unfccc. intresourceprocessguideprocess-p. pdf see also Mary Anne Sullivan, Kyoto Wasnt Last Gasp Even Without the Protocol, Greenhouse Gas Regulation Is Coming Here . Legal Times, June 10, 2002, at 30. 47 Kyoto Negotiators Reach 11th-Hour Accord Pact Ready for Ratification by Governments . 24 Intl Envt Rep. (BNA) 1009, at 1009 (Nov. 21, 2001). 48 Emily Boyd et al. Intl Inst. Sustainable Dev. Summary of the Eighth Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change: 23 October1 November 2002 . 12 Earth Negotiations Bull. Nov. 4, 2002, at 1, 13, available at iisd. ca downloadpdfenb12209e. pdf. 49 Mara Gutirrez et al. Intl Inst. Sustainable Dev. Summary of the Ninth Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change: 1-12 December 2003 . 12 Earth Negotiations Bull. Dec. 15, 2003, at 1, 16, available at iisd. cadownload pdfenb12231e. pdf. 50 Intl Envtl Law Comm. International Environmental Law: 2004 Annual Report , in Environment, Energy and Resources Law: The Year in Review 2004, at 69, 7071 (Marla E. Mansfield et al. ed. 2005). 51 Kyle W. Danish, The Effect of the Kyoto Protocol on U. S. Companies . 36 Trends (ABA), Mar. Apr. 2005, at 8, 8. 52 Eric J. Lyman, U. N. Conference Agrees to Open Discussions on What Will Follow Initial Five-Year Period . 36 Envt Rep. (BNA) 2565, at 2565 (Dec. 16, 2005) see also Eric J. Lyman, Conference Participants Note Increasing Attention on Adaptation as Weather Worsens . 36 Envt Rep. (BNA) 2566, at 2567 (Dec. 16, 2005) (discussing EU suggestion that post-2012 adaptation should play a larger role relative to mitigation) Eric J. Lyman, Agreement on Carbon Capture, Storage May Set Stage for Formal U. N. Recognition . 36 Envt Rep. (BNA) 2567, at 256768 (Dec. 16, 2005) (describing agreement reached on points related to carbon capture and storage). 53 Susan R. Fletcher amp Larry Parker, Cong. Research Serv. RL 33826, Climate Change: The Kyoto Protocol and International Actions 14 (2007). 54 Dean Scott, Delgates at U. N. Conference OK Review of Kyoto Protocol, Agree on Adaptation Fund . 29 Intl Envt Rep. (BNA) 909, at 909 (Nov. 29, 2006). 56 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, United Nations Climate Change Conference in Bali, unfcccbali. orgunfccceventclimate-changecop-13-and-copmop-3.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2010). 57 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 40. 58 Richard Lloyd Parry, US Rejects Climate Guidelines at Bali Conference . Times (London), Dec. 13, 2007, available at timesonline. co. uktolnewsenvironmentarticle 3042430.ece. 59 Andrew C. Revkin amp Thomas Fuller, Climate Plan Looks Beyond Bushs Tenure . N. Y. Times, Dec. 16, 2007, at A1. 60 Doug Obey, Deal on Adaptation Funds Hailed as Key Breakthrough of Bali Talks . 18 Clean Air Rep. (Inside EPA), no. 26, Dec. 27, 2007, at 12, 12. 61 Daniel Pruzin, Intergovernmental Panel Elects New Board, Adopts Program for Next Assessment Report . 39 Envt Rep. (BNA) 1823, at 1823 (Sept. 12, 2008). 62 Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, Bali, Indon. Dec. 315, 2007, Report on the Conference of the Parties on its Thirteenth Session, Part Two: Action Taken By the Conference of the Parties at its Thirteenth Session . U. N. Doc. FCCCCP20076Add.1 para. 1.b. ii (Mar. 14, 2008). 63 Eric J. Lyman, Climate Change Talks End with Mandate to Draft Next Kyoto, but Many Goals Unmet . 39 Envt Rep. (BNA) 2492, at 2492 (Dec. 19, 2008). 66 Dean Scott et al. Negotiators Hope U. N. Talks in Poland Will Yield Draft Text for Post-Kyoto Deal . 39 Envt Rep. (BNA) 2382, at 238384 (Nov. 28, 2008). 67 Dean Scott amp Eric J. Lyman, As Hope for Binding Climate Deal Fades, Copenhagen Aims to Be Springboard to 2010 . 40 Envt Rep. (BNA) 2733, at 2733 (Nov. 27, 2009). 69 Daniel Abebe amp Jonathan S. Masur, International Agreements, International Heterogeneity, and Climate Change: The Two Chinas Problem . 50 Va. J. Intl L. 325, 360 (2010). 70 Energy Info. Admin. International Energy Annual 2006, at tbl. H.1gco2 (2008), available at eia. doe. govieacarbon. html (click on H.1gco2 link). 71 See Kevin A. Baumert et al. World Res. Inst. Navigating the Numbers: Greenhouse Gas Data and International Policy 27 (2005) see also Christopher Flavin, Slowing Global Warming , in State of the World 1990, at 19 (Linda Starke ed. 1990) (discussing declining energy intensities in many national economies) Jonathan Watts, China Means Business with First-Ever Carbon Emissions Targets . Environment Blog (Nov. 27, 2009 12:15 GMT), guardian. co. ukenvironmentblogpage25 (noting that Chinas carbon intensity reduction targets slows the rate of carbon emission growth but does not reduce emission levels). 72 Compare Scott amp Lyman, supra note 67, at 2734, with Press Release, The White House, President Announces Clear Skies amp Global Climate Change Initiatives (Feb. 14, 2002), available at georgewbush-whitehouse. archives. govnewsreleases200202print20020214-5.html. 73 Justus amp Fletcher, supra note 43, at 8 see also Climate VISION, Welcome to Climate VISION, climatevision. gov (last visited Nov. 21, 2010) (discussing the governments climate change policy) U. S. Dept of State, Climate Change, state. govgoesclimateindex. htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2010) (discussing the U. S. Department of States global climate change policy). 74 David G. Victor, Editorial, Weak on Warming . Wash. Post, Feb. 19, 2002, at A15. 75 Leora Falk, Report Says More Energy-Efficient Economy Led to Smaller Increase in Carbon Emissions . 41 Envt Rep. (BNA) 938, at 938 (Apr. 30, 2010). 76 Stephen Gardner, EU to Continue With Climate Goals, Denies Being Sidelined in Copenhagen Negotiations . 41 Envt Rep. (BNA) 45, at 45 (Jan. 1, 2010). 77 See Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, Copenhagen, Den. Dec. 719, 2009, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at Its Fifteenth Session . U. N. Doc. FCCCCP200911Add.1 (2009), available at unfccc. int resourcedocs2009cop15eng11a01.pdf. 78 Eric J. Lyman amp Dean Scott, Delegates Reach Agreement in Copenhagen but Look to 2010 for Resumption of Talks , 41 Envt Rep. (BNA) 40, at 40 (Jan. 1, 2010) Steven D. Cook, China, India Agree to Attach Their Names to Copenhagen Greenhouse Accord , 41 Envt Rep. (BNA) 543, at 543 (Mar. 12, 2010). 79 Lyman amp Scott, supra note 78, at 40. 80 Elliot Diringer et al. Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Summary: Copenhagen Climate Summit, pewclimate. orginternationalcopenhagen-climate-summit-summary (last visited Nov. 21, 2010). 81 See Scott Barrett, Copenhagen: Yet Another Giant Beginning with an Uncertain End . Yale Global Online, Dec. 21, 2009, yaleglobal. yale. educontentcopenhagen-yet-another-giant-beginning-uncertain-end (discussing how the Accord allows countries to select a base year) United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Appendix I Quantified Economy-Wide Emissions Targets for 2020, unfccc. inthomeitems5264.php (last visited Nov. 21, 2010) (listing base years for Annex I parties). 82 Diringer et al., supra note 80. 83 Eric J. Lyman, EU Says Wealthy Nations Should Submit Formal Climate Aid Pledges to United Nations . 41 Envt Rep. (BNA) 1759, at 1759 (Aug. 6, 2010). 84 John M. Broder, Obama Offers Targets to Cut Greenhouse Gas . N. Y. Times, Nov. 26, 2011, at A1. 85 Nacha Cattan, Top U. N. Climate Official Says Future Accord Could Affect Limited Countries Commitments . 41 Envt Rep. (BNA) 1639 (July 23, 2010) Eric J. Lyman, De Boer Says Climate Change Treaty Unlikely to Be in Place Until Late 2011 . 41 Envt Rep. (BNA) 783, at 783 (Apr. 9, 2010) Eric J. Lyman et al. In Aftermath of Copenhagen Conference, Delegates Say It Is Time to Rethink U. N. Role . 41 Envt Rep. (BNA) 44, at 44 (Jan. 1, 2010) Dean Scott amp Eric J. Lyman, Expectations Scaled Back for Mexico Talks in Hopes of Avoiding Replay of Copenhagen . 41 Envt Rep. (BNA) 372, at 372 (Feb. 19, 2010). 86 Arnold W. Reitze, Jr. Federal Control of Carbon Dioxide Emissions: What Are the Options . 36 B. C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 1, 72 (2009). 87 See Carbon Dioxide Info. Analysis Ctr. Global Fossil Fuel Carbon Emissions Graphics, cdiac. ornl. govtrendsemisglo. html (last visited Nov. 21, 2010). 88 Negative Population Growth, Total Midyear World Population: 1950-2050, npg. orgfactsworldpopyear. htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2010) (showing that world population in 1950 was 2,555,982,611 and is estimated to be 6,840,423,256 in 2010. The annual increase in 2010 is estimated at 75,755,042). 89 Arnold W. Reitze, Jr. Population, Consumption and Environmental Law . 12 Nat. Resources amp Envt, no. 1, Summer 1997 at 89, 89. 90 Larry Parker amp John Blodgett, Cong. Research Serv. RL 32721, Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Perspectives on the Top 20 Emitters and Developed Versus Developing Nations 3 (2008), available at fas. orgsgpcrsmiscRL32721.pdf. 91 See id. at 5 (noting that share of emissions attributed to Annex I countries is declining) U. S. Energy Info. Admin. Total Carbon Dioxide Emissions from the Consumption of Energy (Million Metric Tons) (2010), available at tonto. eia. doe. govcfappsipdbproject IEDIndex3.cfmtid90amppid44ampaid8 (click Download Excel) (noting that China surpassed the United States in total CO2 emissions from the consumption of fossil fuels in 2006) U. S. Energy Info. Admin. World Primary Energy Consumption (Btu), 1980-2006 (2010), available at eia. doe. govpubinternationaliealftablee1.xls (noting U. S. percentage of total energy consumption in 2006) Cent. Intelligence Agency, Country Comparison: Population, The World Fact Book, cia. govlibrarypublicationsthe-world-factbookrankorder 2119rank. html (Nov. 20, 2010) (indicating that the United States is the third largest country in the world by population and providing population break down by country). 92 Parker amp Blodgett, supra note 89, at 4. 93 Energy Info. Admin., supra note 70, at tbl. H.1cco2, (click on H.1cco2 link). 94 Id. (calculating from data) U. S. Dept of State, Countries and Other Areas, state. govpafciindex. htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2010) (noting what countries constitute Sub-Sahara). 95 Energy Info. Admin., supra note 70, at tbl. H.1cco2, (click on H.1cco2 link). 96 Parker amp Blodgett, supra note 90, at 5. 98 Austl. Chamber of Commerce amp Indus. A Multilateral Solution to Climate Change is Vital 2 (2008), available at acci. asn. autextfilesACCIPolicyReview2008 APRIssue6June08.pdf (discussing the migration of economic activity to developing countries) Energy Info. Admin., supra note 70, at tbl. H.1co2, (click on H.1co2 link) (calculating from data) Press Release, The White House, President Bush Discusses Global Climate Change (June 11, 2001), georgewbushwhitehouse. archives. govnewsreleases200106print20010611-2.html (citing the general and economic unfairness of the Kyoto Protocol in exempting developing nations like China and India from emission standards). 99 Energy Info. Admin., supra note 70, at tbl. H.1co2, (click on H.1co2 link) (calculating from data). 100 Peter Sheehan amp Fiona Sun, Energy Use in China: Interpreting Changing Trends and Future Directions 1 (Ctr. for Strategic Econ. Studies, Climate Change Working Paper No. 13, 2007), available at cfsesdocumentsclimate13SheehanampSunEnergy UseChina. pdf. 102 Margaret J. Kim amp Robert E. Jones, Chinas Energy Security and the Climate Change Conundrum . 19 Nat. Resources amp Envt, Winter 2005 at 3, 7 Fareed Zakaria, Editorial, In Search of a Better Kyoto , Wash. Post, April 9, 2007, at A13. 103 Energy Info. Admin. Table 11.10 World Petroleum Consumption, 19602008, eia. doe. govemeuaertxtptb1110.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2010). 104 Id. (calculated from the data). 105 Stacy C. Davis, Susan W. Diegel amp Robert G. Boundy, U. S. Dept of Energy, Transportation Energy Data Book 3-2 tbl.3.1 (2009), available at kerstech PDFsTransportation20Energy20Data20Book202009.pdf. 106 Intl Org. of Motor Vehicle Mfrs. World Motor Vehicle Production by Country and Type 2007-2008, available at oicawp-contentuploadsall-vehicles. pdf. 107 Robert O. Mendelsohn, An Economists View of the Kyoto Climate Treaty . Natl Pub. Radio Online, Feb. 18, 2005, npr. orgtemplatesstorystoryphp. storyId4504298 (last visited Nov. 21, 2010). 108 This figure is based on a U. S. population in 1990 of 249 million and a September 2010 estimated population of 310 million. Compare Nationmaster, People Statistics: Population (1990) by Country, nationmastergraphpeopop-people-populationampdate1990 (last visited Nov. 21, 2010), with US. Census Bureau, U. S. amp World Population Clock, census. govpopulationwwwpopclockus. html (last visited Nov. 21, 2010). 109 Compare Nationmaster, supra note 108, and U. S. Census Bureau, supra note 108, with HistoryCentral, Nation By Nation Almanac, nationbynation (last visited Nov. 21, 2010) (providing data for the other G-8 nations, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, and the United Kingdom). 110 U. S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 13, at 4. 112 Stephen Gardner, Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions Increased 15 Percent from 20002005, EU Data Show . 40 Envt Rep. (BNA) 1242, at 1242 (May 29, 2009). 113 Calculated using statistics published by the United States Department of Energy (DOE). Energy Info. Admin. supra note 70, at tbl. H.1co2, (click on H.1co2 link). 114 U. S. Dept of Energy, International Energy Outlook 2009, at 109 (2009), available at eia. doe. govoiafarchiveieo09index. html (click on Chapter 8. Energy-Related Carbon Dioxide Emissions). 118 The top 20 emitters of CO2in 2006, in the order of their emissions, were China, United States, Russian Federation, India, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, Canada, South Korea, Italy, Islamic Republic of Iran, Mexico, South Africa, France, Saudi Arabia, Australia, Brazil, Spain, Indonesia, and Ukraine. See Energy Info. Admin. supra note 70, at tbl. H.1co2 (click on H.1co2 link). 119 See id. Some efforts in this direction occurred when on July 8, 2009, the G-8 agreed to reduce their GHG emissions by 80 by 2050, although they did not specify the baseline or promise any specific reductions. Eric J. Lyman, Major Economies Vow to Limit Increase in Temperature, but Omit Emissions Target , 40 Envt Rep. (BNA) 1631, at 163132 (July 10, 2009). 120 Pew Ctr. for Global Climate Change, Climate Action in Congress, pewclimate. orgwhatsbeingdoneinthecongress (last visited Nov. 21, 2010). 121 See Reitze, supra note 86, at 26 (describing climate change legislative proposals before 2008). 122 Bryan Walsh, Cap and Trade Is Dead (Really, Truly, Im Not Kidding). Whos to Blame . Time Ecocentric Blog (July 22, 2010, 7:15 PM), ecocentric. blogs. time. 123 See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr. Electric Power in a Carbon Constrained World , 34 Wm. amp Mary Envtl. L. amp Poly Rev. 821, 91014 (2010) (discussing the efforts in the House to enact H. R. 2454 and S. 1733). 124 H. R. Rep. No. 111137, pt. 1, at 277 (2009). 125 Richard C. Stoll, House Global Climate Bill Mandates Many EPA Rulemakings with Tight Deadlines . 40 Envt Rep. (BNA) 1672, at 1672 (July 10, 2009). 126 Press Release, Majority Page, U. S. S. Comm. on Envt amp Pub. Works, Kerry, Boxer Introduce Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, Sept. 30, 2009, epw. senate. govpublicindex. cfmFuseActionMajority. PressReleasesampContentRecordid0c00344c-802a-23ad-4f4d-edb0c9408d2e (last visited Nov. 21, 2010). 127 Press Release, Majority Page, U. S. S. Comm. on Envt amp Pub. Works, Boxer Statement on Committee Passage of S. 1733The Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, Nov. 5, 2009, epw. senate. govpublicindex. cfmFuseActionMajority. PressReleasesampContentRecordidc512ac4d-802a-23ad-4884-2b95a8405efe (last visited Nov. 21, 2010) (noting that this bill was passed without any support or participation from Republican members of the committee). 128 Bill Summary amp Status, 111th Cong. (20092010), S. 1733, All Congressional Actions, thomas. loc. govhomeLegislativeData. phpnBSS (search by Bill Number for S. 1733 and then select All Congressional Actions). 129 Dean Scott, Bill Maintains Emissions Cuts, EPA Authority, Leaves Negotiating Room for Senate Debate . 40 Envt Rep. (BNA) 2282, at 228384 (Oct. 2, 2009). 130 Leora Falk, Senate, House Bills Differ on Key Provisions Details on Senate Legislation Still to Come . 40 Envt Rep. (BNA) 2284, at 2285 (Oct. 2, 2009). 170 Lynn Garner, Dorgan Plans to Push for Energy Bill, Says Senate Unlikely to Take Up Climate in 2010 . 41 Envt Rep. (BNA) 155, at 155 (Jan. 22, 2010). 171 American Power Act, S. 111th Cong. (2010) (Discussion Draft introduced to the Senate by Sen. John Kerry), available at kerry. senate. govimomediadocAPAbill3.pdf Jason Schaefer, A Market-Based Approach: The Best Way to Transition to a New Energy Economy While Meeting the Responsibility to Address Global Climate ChangeA North Dakota Perspective . 85 N. D. L. Rev. 849, 891 (2009). 172 Press Release, Office of Senator John Kerry, Kerry, Lieberman: American Power Act Bill Will Secure Americas Energy, Climate Future, (May 12, 2010), kerry. senate. govpress releaseid5e1dc216-ce17-4cc2-92e1-8321efc8240c. 173 Dean Scott, Climate Bill Suffers Setback as Sen. Graham Withdraws Support Over Scheduling Dispute . 41 Envt Rep. (BNA) 928, at 928 (Apr. 30, 2010). 174 Office of Senator John Kerry, American Power Act, kerry. senate. govwork issuesissueid7f6b4d4a-da4a-409e-a5e7-15567cc9e95c (last visited Nov. 21, 2010). 175 American Power Act, S. secs. 1122, 1201, 1401, 1412, 1601, 1602 . 276 Ari Natter, Senate Energy Committee Considers Adding Clean Energy Measures to Passed Legislation , 41 Envt Rep. (BNA) 1355, at 1355 (June 18, 2010). The bills are: S.3460, the Million Solar Roofs Act of 2010 S.3396, the Supply Star Act of 2010 S.3251, the Improving Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Use By Federal Agencies Act of 2010 S.679, the Heavy Duty Hybrid Vehicle Research, Development, and Demonstration Act of 2009 and S.2900, the Gas Turbine Efficiency Act of 2009. Id. see also Dean Scott, As Momentum from 2008 Election Fades, Senators Struggle to Salvage Climate Bill , 41 Envt Rep. (BNA) 1616, 1616 (July 16, 2010) Dean Scott, Reid Abandons Carbon Limits in Energy Bill, Will Focus on Oil Spills, Efficiency Measures , 41 Envt. Rep. (BNA) 1633, 1633 (July 23, 2010). 277 This material on GHG reporting is a modified and updated version of material appearing in Reitze, supra note 123, at 833. 278 Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776. 279 Id. 1605(b), 106 Stat. at 300203 (codified at 42 U. S.C. 13385(b) (2006)). 280 Id. (The Secretary shall, after opportunity for public comment, issue guidelines for the voluntary collection and reporting of information on sources of greenhouse gases.). 281 10 C. F.R. 300.1, 300.13 (2006) see Energy Info. Admin. Guidelines for Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Reporting (2006), available at eia. doe. govoiaf1605 FinalGenGuidelines041306.pdf. 282 Energy Info. Admin. Climate VISION: 1605(B) Reporting Guidelines, climatevision. gov1605b. html (last visited Nov. 21, 2010) (discussing the revision of the voluntary GHG guidelines under 1605(b) to what they are today under Climate Vision). 283 U. S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Climate Leaders, epa. govclimateleaders (last visited Nov. 21, 2010). 284 Pamela Wexler amp David Hodas, Special Committee on Climate Change and Sustainable Development 1995 Annual Report , in Natural Resource, Energy, and Environmental Law 1995, the Year in Review, 164, 168 (1996). 285 See The Climate Registry, List of Members, theclimateregistry. orgmembers (last visited Nov. 20, 2010). 286 Clean Air Act, 42 U. S.C. 7651k (2006). 287 U. S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Clean Energy: eGRID FAQ, epa. govcleanenergy energy-resourcesegridfaq. html (last visited Nov. 21, 2010). 288 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 1844. 289 See id. tit. II, 121 Stat. at 2128. 290 Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. ريج. 56,260 (Oct. 30, 2009) (codified in scattered sections of 40 C. F.R.). 291 Id. at 56,26465 (noting that annual reporting is required for emissions of CO2, methane, NOx, sulfur hexafluoride, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and other fluorinated gases). 292 Clean Air Act, 42 U. S.C. 7414(a), 7542(b) (2006). 293 74 Fed. ريج. at 56,267. 294 Id. at 56,264. CO2 equivalent means the amount of carbon dioxide by weight emitted into the atmosphere that would produce the same estimated radiative forcing as a given weight of another radiatively active gas. Energy Info. Admin. Glossary, eia. doe. gov glossaryglossaryc. htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2010). CO2 equivalents are computed by multiplying the weight of the gas being measured (for example, methane) by its estimated global warming potential (which is 21 for methane). هوية شخصية. Carbon equivalent units are defined as carbon dioxide equivalents multiplied by the carbon content of carbon dioxide (i. e. 1244). هوية شخصية. 295 74 Fed. ريج. at 56,26667. 298 See id. at 56,26667 (listing facilities subject to reporting). 300 See Regulatory Announcement, U. S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA and NHTSA Finalize Historic National Program to Reduce Greenhouse Gases and Improve Fuel Economy for Cars and Trucks 1 (2010), available at epa. govomsclimateregulations420f10901.pdf. 301 U. S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Final Mandatory Greenhouse Gases Reporting Rule 5 (2009), available at epa. govclimatechangeemissionsdownloads09FinalMRR Overview. pdf see also 74 Fed. ريج. at 56,264 (referring to facilities responsible for 85 of the U. S. GHG emissions) Draft Guidance Federal Greenhouse Gas Accounting and Reporting, 75 Fed. ريج. 41,452 (July 16, 2010) (announcing that the Council on Environmental Quality released draft guidance for GHG emissions reporting from federal agency operations on July 16, 2010). 302 74 Fed. ريج. at 56,270 U. S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 301, at 14. 303 Steven D. Cook, EPA Proposes Greenhouse Gas Reporting for Oil and Gas Wells, Carbon Storage, HFCs . 41 Envt Rep. Online (BNA) 659, at 659 (Mar. 26, 2010). 339 74 Fed. ريج. 66,496, 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C. F.R. ch. 1). 340 Steven D. Cook, Sixteen Lawsuits Filed Challenging EPA Rule That Greenhouse Gas Emissions Pose Danger , 41 Envt Rep. (BNA) 363, at 363 (Feb. 19, 2010). In May 2010, the National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) was added to the industry groups challenging the endangerment finding. Electrical Manufacturers Challenge Greenhouse Gas Endangerment Finding , 21 Clean Air Rep. (Inside EPA) May 27, 2010, at 22. In addition, ten petitions were filed with EPA to reconsider its endangerment finding. See EPA Rejects 10 Petitions to Reconsider Climate Risk Finding . 21 Clean Air Rep. (Inside EPA) Aug. 5, 2010, at 19. They were rejected on July 29, 2010. Id. 341 Cook, supra note 340, at 363. 342 Lacey, supra note 324, at 18. 343 U. S. Chamber Sues EPA over Rejection of GHG Endangerment Petition . 21 Clean Air Rep. (Inside EPA) Aug. 19, 2010, at 31. 344 Critics Say Murkowski Resolution Sets Dangerous Science Precedent . 21 Clean Air Rep. (Inside EPA) Feb. 4, 2010, at 25. 345 See Doug Obey, Murkowski Seen Eyeing Jobs Debate for Push to Block EPA Climate Rules . 27 Envtl. Poly Alert (Inside EPA) Jan. 27, 2010, at 26 (noting that only three Democrats have supported Murkowski) NHTSA Joins EPA in Opposing Murkowski Push to Block Vehicle GHG Rules . Clean Air Rep. (Inside EPA) Mar. 4, 2010, at 31 (discussing the battle between Republican and Democratic Senators over EPAs endangerment finding). 346 Steven D. Cook, Skelton, Peterson, Emerson Introduce Bill to Eliminate EPA Greenhouse Gas Authority . 41 Envt Rep. (BNA) 261, at 261 (Feb. 5, 2010) see U. S. Senate Roll Call Votes 111th Congress2nd Session, senate. govlegislativeLISrollcalllistsrollcallvote cfm. cfmcongress111ampsession2ampvote00184 (last visited Nov. 21, 2010). 347 Doug Obey, Senate Climate Agenda Remains Murky as Democrats Acknowledge Split . 27 Envtl. Poly Alert (Inside EPA) June 16, 2010, at 23. 348 Steven D. Cook amp Dean Scott, Senators Seek Vote on Rockefeller Bill to Delay EPA Regulation of Carbon Emissions . 41 Envt Rep. (BNA) 1354, at 1354 (June 18, 2010). 349 75 Fed. ريج. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of 40 C. F.R. and 49 C. F.R.). 350 See Office of Air Quality Planning amp Standards, U. S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Our Nations Air: Status and Trends Through 2008, at 56 (2010), available at epa. gov airtrends2010reportairpollution. pdf. 351 See Clean Air Act, 42 U. S.C. 74087410 (2006). The criteria pollutants are particulate matter, SO2, nitrogen dioxide, carbon monoxide, ozone, and lead. See 40 C. F.R. 50.4.13 (2009) (establishing national primary and secondary ambient air quality standards for each criteria pollutant). 352 42 U. S.C. 7410(a) (2006). 353 Robert J. Martineau, Jr. Hazardous Air Pollutants . in The Clean Air Act Handbook 227, 243 (2d ed. 2004). 354 42 U. S.C. 7408(a) (2006). 357 U. S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Technical Support Document for Endangerment and Cause and Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act 17 (2009). 358 Delaware in 2008 became the first state to include CO2 as a pollutant in its SIP, which triggers the need to address the pollutant in the states PSD program. Steven D. Cook, Revisions to Delaware Plan Raise Possibility of Carbon Dioxide Regulation Under Air Act . 39 Envt Rep. (BNA) 1818, at 1818 (Sept. 12, 2008). 359 There are small variations between the northern and southern hemisphere of about 2 ppm because more fossil fuel is burned in the northern hemisphere. John Houghton, Global Warming: The Complete Briefing 27 (4th ed. 2009). 360 Intl Energy Agency, CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion: Highlights 10, 11 (2009). 361 See Nathaniel Lord Martin, The Reform of New Source Review: Toward a More Balanced Approach . 23 Stan. Envtl. L. J. 351, 354 (2004) (discussing characterizations of the NSR program prior to 2002 reforms) see also 42 U. S.C. 7475 (2006) (PSD program). 362 Dawn Reeves, Activists Petition EPA for CO2 NAAQS Citing Insufficient Climate Action . 20 Clean Air Rep. (Inside EPA) Dec. 10, 2009, at 4. 363 Colorado Gas Bill Touted as Model for States to Meet EPA Air Rules . 27 Envtl. Poly Alert (Inside EPA) Apr. 7, 2010, at 38, 39. 364 U. S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Fact Sheet: Revisions to the Primary National Ambient Air Quality Standard, Monitoring Network, and Data Reporting Requirements for Sulfur Dioxide 1 (2010), available at epa. govairsulfurdioxidepdfs20100602fs. pdf . 365 See Andrew Childers, EPA Establishes First Hourly Air Standard for Sulfur Dioxide, Revokes Other Standards . 41 Envt Rep. (BNA) 1221, at 1221 (June 4, 2010). 366 Arnold W. Reitze, Jr. New Source Review: Should It Survive . 34 Envtl L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,673, at 10,673 (July 2004). 367 Id. 61 Fed. ريج. 38,250, 38,30910 (proposed July 23, 1996) (to be codified at 40 C. F.R. pts. 51, 52) (explaining the purpose and objectives of PSD review). 368 Reitze, supra note 366, at 10,673. 369 See, e. g. . Clean Air Act, 42 U. S.C. 7475(a)(2) (2006). See generally Reitze, supra note 366, at 10,673 (overview of the NSR program). 370 42 U. S.C. 7475(a)(3), 7479(3) (2006) see also Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc. 129 S. Ct. 1498, 1510 (2009) (upholding EPAs use of a cost-benefit analysis to determine the best technology under the Clean Water Acts effluent discharge standard) Alaska Dept Envtl. Conservation v. U. S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 540 U. S. 461, 47173 (2004). 371 42 U. S.C. 7503(a)(2) (2006). 372 U. S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, New Source Review Workshop Manual: Prevention of Deterioration and Nonattainment Area Permitting, at B.5 (1990), available at epa. govregion07airnsrnsrmemos1990wman. pdf. 374 40 C. F.R. 51.166(b)(12) (2010). 375 42 U. S.C. 7416 (2006) Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 372, at B.57. 376 See, e. g. . Svend Brandt-Erichsen amp Dustin Till, EPA Issues Final Rule Regulating Greenhouse Gases from New and Modified Sources . Marten Law (May 14, 2010), available at martenlawnewsletter20100514-epa-issues-final-ghg-rule (last visited Nov. 21, 2010). 377 42 U. S.C. 7475(a)(4) (2006). 378 See id. 7410(a)(2)(D), 7411(a), 7411(f), 7501 40 C. F.R. 423.15 (2009). 379 42 U. S.C. 7411(a)(1), (b), (f). 380 Id. 7602(g) (The term air pollutant means any air pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical, biological, radioactive. substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air.). 381 Memorandum from Stephen L. Johnson, Admr, to Regl Admrs (Dec. 18, 2008), available at epa. govNSRdocumentspsdinterpretivememo12.18.08.pdf. 382 42 U. S.C. 7416 (2006). 383 See 40 C. F.R. 52.50.2635 (2009) (approving SIP). For instance, Maine has been delegated authority to implement both its nonattainment NSR and PSD program. هوية شخصية. 52.1026, 52.1029. 384 Memorandum from Stephen L. Johnson, supra note 381. 385 Id. But see Genesee Power Station, 4 E. A.D. 832, 848 (EAB 1993) (holding that the environmental impact of unregulated pollutant is a proper consideration in selecting the appropriate control technology for regulated pollutants) N. Country Res. Recovery Assocs. 2 E. A.D. 229, 230 (Admr 1986) (holding that it is clearly within EPAs authority to evaluate the environmental impact of unregulated pollutants in making a BACT determination). 386 Deseret Power Electric Coop. PSD Appeal No. 07-03, slip op. at 1 (EAB Nov. 13, 2008), available at yosemite. epa. govoaEABWebDocket. nsfFilings20By20Appeal-Number C8C5985967D8096E85257500006811A7FileRemand823039.pdf. 389 Id. at 1, 6364. The Board held that prior EPA actions were insufficient to establish a historic, binding interpretation that subject to regulation for PSD purposes included only those pollutants subject to regulations that require actual control of emissions. هوية شخصية. at 89. However, EAB rejected arguments that the CAA compelled only one interpretation of the phrase subject to regulation and found no evidence of a congressional intent to apply BACT to pollutants that are subject only to monitoring and reporting requirements. هوية شخصية. at 31, 3334, 63. EAB encouraged EPA to consider addressing this issue as an action of nationwide scope, rather than through this specific permitting proceeding. هوية شخصية. at 64. Because the grant of reconsideration directed EPA to conduct this reconsideration using a notice and comment process, the proposal did not address the procedural challenge presented in the Petition for Reconsideration. هوية شخصية. at 6465. EAB did not rule on a Sierra Club argument that section 821 of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399, 2699, which is not codified in the CAA, but which require monitoring and reporting of CO2 emissions, is a regulation under the CAA. هوية شخصية. at 31. 390 PSD Appeal No. 08-02 (EAB Feb. 18, 2009), available at yosemite. epa. gov oaEABWEBDocket. nsfFilings20By20Appeal20Number06DBEC31EBFD8C3E852575620052318BFileDenying20and20Remanding823079.pdf. 392 Nancy J. Moore, Texas Agency Approves Air Permits for Expansion of Coal-Fired Power Plant . 41 Envt Rep. (BNA) 1025, at 1025 (May 7, 2010). 393 73 Fed. ريج. 80,300, 80,30001 (proposed Dec. 31, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C. F.R. pt. 52) (providing public notice of EPAs interpretation regarding what pollutants are subject to regulation). 430 Id. at 55,302 see also Alec Zacaroli, Ben Snowden amp Julie R. Domike, EPA Begins Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act , 40 Envt Rep. (BNA) 2859, at 2859, 2861 (Dec. 11, 2009) (noting the implications for Title V permits of applying the existing threshold to GHG sources). 431 Stuart Parker amp Molly Davis, States Cite Legal Concerns in Urging Delay for EPA GHG Permitting Rule . 20 Clean Air Rep. (Inside EPA) Dec. 10, 2009, at 3132. Florida has asked EPA to take over stationary source permitting for GHGs because it cannot make the required changes before the tailoring rule trigger date of January 2, 2011. Doug Obey, State Says EPA Must Take over Permits to Implement GHG Tailoring Rule . 21 Clean Air Rep. (Inside EPA) Aug. 5, 2010, at 20. 433 Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. ريج. 31,513 (June 3, 2010) (codified at 40 C. F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70 amp 71). 442 Clean Air Act, 42 U. S.C. 76617661b (2006) id. 7479(1). Industry is also asking EPA to amend its rules to remove pollutants from PSD review if they are not subject to ambient air quality standards. Doug Obey, Industry Cites GHG Limits as Basis to Revise EPAs Years-Old PSD Rules . 31 Wkly. Rep. (Inside EPA) July 16, 2010, at 7. EPA also sent two proposed rules to the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review. EPA Sends GHG Permit Backstop Proposals to White House for Review , 27 Envtl. Poly Alert (Inside EPA) July 14, 2010, at 21. The first proposed rule would ensure state and local permit programs have the authority to regulate GHGs. هوية شخصية. The second proposed rule outlines EPAs authority to impose a federal implementation plan (FIP) to take over GHG permitting until states obtain the authority to run a GHG permit program. هوية شخصية. 444 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H. R. 2454, 111th Cong. sec. 331, 831 (2009). 446 H. R. 2454, sec. 331, 833. 452 Clean Air Act, 42 U. S.C. 7475(a)(2), 7503(a)(5) (2006). 453 See Gregory B. Foote, Considering Alternatives: The Case for Limiting CO2 Emissions from New Power Plants Through New Source Review . 34 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,642, at 10,65051 (July 2004). 454 See, e. g. . Sierra Club v. U. S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 499 F.3d 653, 657 (7th Cir. 2007). 455 Prairie State Generating Co. 13 E. A.D. 1, 28 (EAB Aug. 24, 2006), yosemite. epa. gov oaEABWebDocket. nsfdac76d2b073d9f75852573da006e9fc97414685644289ceb852571d4006785e2OpenDocument (last visited Nov. 21, 2010). 456 499 F.3d at 657. 458 Press Release, Natl Energy Tech. Lab. U. S. Dept of Energy, Department of Energy Tracks Resurgence of Coal-Fired Power Plants (Aug. 2, 2006), wwwl. doe. govpublicationspress200606046-Coal-FiredPowerPlantsDatabase. html (last visited Nov. 21, 2010). 459 Ola Maurstad, Lab. for Energy amp the Envt. Mass. Inst. of Tech. An Overview of Coal Based Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) Technology 2-3 (2005), available at sequestration. mit. edupdfLFEE2005-002WP. pdf. 460 Reitze, supra note 86, at 35. 461 Air Prods. amp Chemicals, Inc. CO2Capture and Purification Technologies, airproductsResponsibilityEHSEnvironmentalProtectionGasification. html (last visited Nov. 21, 2010). 462 Maurstad, supra note 459, at 29. 463 Maurstad, supra note 459, at 6. 516 42 U. S.C. 7212(b)(2) (2006). 517 H. R. Rep. No. 101-490, pt. 1, at 315 (1990). However, the 1989 Senate report is more ambiguous and would allow environmental effects to include a significant adverse effect on the environment. S. Rep. No. 101-228, at 160162 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U. S.C. C.A. N. 3385, 354547. 518 Ethyl Corp. v. U. S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 541 F.2d 1, 23 (D. C. Cir. 1976) (quoting Amoco Oil Co. v. U. S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 501 F.2d 722, 740741(D. C. Cir. 1974)). 519 74 Fed. ريج. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C. F.R. ch. 1). 520 42 U. S.C. 7412(a)(1) (2006). EPA also has a Great Water Program pursuant to CAA section 112(m) to deal with atmospheric deposition of HAPs, and other pollutants, in order to protect major water bodies. هوية شخصية. 7412(m). 521 See U. S. Dept of Energy, supra note 421. 522 See Elizabeth M. Morss, Clean Air Act Implementation: An Industry Perspective . 14 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 63, 6465 (1996) (detailing industry criticisms of regulatory burdens imposed on facilities undergoing new construction or modifications subject to NSR requirements). 523 See Am. Nurses Assn v. Jackson, No. 08-2198, 2010 WL 1506913, at 1 (D. D.C. Apr. 15, 2010) (consent decree) Molly Davis, District Court Order Could Bolster EPA in Pursuit of Power Plant MACT . 21 Clean Air Rep. (Inside EPA) Apr. 29, 2010, at 20. 524 Natural Res. Def. Council v. U. S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 489 F.3d 1250, 1254 (D. C. Cir. 2007). 525 Kate Winston, Industry Revives Bid for Controversial Compliance Option in Boiler MACT . 21 Clean Air Rep. (Inside EPA) Apr. 15, 2010, at 38. 526 Alan Kovski, State Judge Rules Air Permit Invalid for Coal-Fired Plant Under Construction . 40 Envt Rep. (BNA) 1977, at 1977 (Aug. 14, 2009). 527 Envtl. Integrity Project amp Earthjustice, Out of Control: Mounting Damages from Coal Ash Waste Sites iv (2010), available at earthjustice. orgsitesdefaultfiles libraryreportsej-eipreportout-of-control-final. pdf. 528 See Activists Cite Coal Ash Water Pollution Data in Push for EPA Rule Release . 27 Envtl. Poly Alert (Inside EPA) Mar. 10, 2010, at 4 Jackson Rebuts Fears over EPA Hazardous Ash Rule Impact on Reuse . 27 Envtl. Poly Alert (Inside EPA) Mar. 10, 2010, at 3. 529 Dawn Reeves, Despite Neutral Proposal, EPA Seen Preferring Hazardous Coal Ash Rules . 31 Wkly. Rep. (Inside EPA) May 7, 2010, at 34. 530 Id. at 4 Charlotte E. Tucker, Meetings at OMB on Coal Ash Proposal Reflect Complexity, Potential Impact of Rule . 41 Envt Rep. (BNA) 163, at 163 (Jan. 22, 2010). 531 See Clean Air Act, 42 U. S.C. 7651 (2006). 532 See New York v. U. S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 852 F.2d 574, 576 (D. C. Cir. 1988) see also 40 C. F.R. حزب العمال. 97 (2009) (SIP Call regulations). 533 42 U. S.C. 7410(k)(5) (2006). 534 Union Electric Co. v. U. S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 427 U. S. 246, 24950 (1976) Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Train, 545 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir. 1976). 535 70 Fed. ريج. 25,162 (May 12, 2005) (codified at 40 C. F.R. pts. 51, 7274, 7778 amp 96). 562 Energy Info. Admin. U. S. Dept of Energy, Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in the U. S. 2008, at 2 (2009), available at eia. doe. govoiaf1605ggrptpdf0573(2008).pdf. 563 Davis, Diegel amp Boundy, supra note 105, at 11-7 tbl.11.6. Electric power production, while not considered an end-use, is the industry that produces the most CO2emissions. Electricity use is allocated to the various economic sectors, but electricity used by the transportation sector is a nominal 0.2 percent of the sectors total energy demand. هوية شخصية. 565 U. S. Census Bureau, Population by Region and Country: 19502050 (2004), available at census. govipcprodwp02tabA-04.xl. 566 Davis, Diegel amp Boundy, supra note 105, at 1-6 tbl.1.5. 567 Id. at 1-15 tbl.1.12, 1-18 tbl.1.13. 568 Energy Info. Admin. U. S. Dept of Energy, Year to Date Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products by PAD District, January-June 2010 (2010), available at eia. doe. govpuboilgaspetroleumdatapublicationspetroleumsupplymonthlycurrentpdftable38.pdf. 569 Energy Info. Admin. U. S. Dept of Energy, World Crude Oil Prices, at tbl. Data1 (2010), available at tonto. eia. doe. govdnavpetxlsPETPRIWCOKW. xls. 570 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1690, 170304 (1970). 571 Compare Clean Air Act, 42 U. S.C. 7521(b) (2006), with id. 1857f-1 (Supp. V 1970). 572 Id. 7521(a)(1) amp (3) (2006). In the 1970 CAA Amendments, the clause stated, which in his judgment causes or contributes to, or is likely to cause or contribute to, air pollution which endangers the public health or welfare, but was changed in 1977 to, which in his judgment cause, or contributes to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. Compare id. 7521(a)(1), with Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. at 1690 (1970). The remainder of section 202(a)(1) and (2) remains as enacted in 1970. 573 42 U. S.C. 7602(g) (2006). 603 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Natl Highway Traffic Safety Admin. 538 F.3d 1172, 117780 (9th Cir. 2008) Carolyn Whetzel, Ninth Circuit Declines to Reconsider Order Striking Down Rules for Light-Duty Trucks . 39 Envt Rep. (BNA) 1682, at 1682 (Aug. 22, 2008). 604 Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 102, 121 Stat. 1492, 149899 (2007). 606 Steven D. Cook, Growth in Vehicle Travel May Wipe Out Emissions Reductions from New CAFE Bill . 39 Envt Rep. (BNA) 158, at 158 (Jan. 25, 2008). 607 Steven D. Cook, Transportation Department Proposes Increase in Fuel Economy Standards for 2011-2015 . 39 Envt Rep. (BNA) 794, at 794 (Apr. 25, 2008). 608 Steven D. Cook, Ninety-One Congressmen Urge Obama to Go Beyond Bush Fuel Economy Standards . 40 Envt Rep. (BNA) 677, at 677 (Mar. 27, 2009). 609 74 Fed. ريج. 14,196, 14,205 (Mar.30, 2009) (codified at 49 C. F.R. pts. 523, 531, 53334 amp 53637). 617 Steven D. Cook, Automobile Industry Drops Lawsuits Against States Adopting California Standards . 41 Envt Rep. (BNA) 778, at 778 (Apr. 9, 2010). The cases dismissed include Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Goldstone in the Ninth Circuit, Association of International Automobile Manufacturers v. Sullivan in the First Circuit, and Green Mountain Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge v. Crombie in the Second Circuit. See Automakers Drop Challenge to GHG Rules, Reserve Right For Post-2016 Suits . 21 Clean Air Rep. (Inside EPA) Apr. 15, 2010, at 27 see also Jackson Vows to Begin Negotiations over Post-2016 Vehicle Rules . 21 Clean Air Rep. (Inside EPA) May 13, 2010, at 18. 618 Coal. for Responsible Regulation v. U. S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 10-1165 (D. C.C. 2010). States and the automobile industry are seeking to intervene on behalf of EPA. Carolyn Whetzel, States, Automakers Support EPA in Industry Challenge to Vehicle Rules . 41 Envt Rep. (BNA) 1295, at 1295 (June 11, 2010). 619 EPA . DOT to Soon Unveil Plans for Next Round of GHG Vehicle Rules . 21 Clean Air Rep. (Inside EPA) Mar. 18, 2010, at 32. 620 EPA Moves Ahead of DOT in Drafting GHG Standards for Trucks . 27 Envtl. Poly Alert (Inside EPA) May 5, 2010, at 25. 621 See 75 Fed. ريج. 25,324, 25,326. 622 See Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (1975) (codified as amended at 49 U. S.C. 32902) 75 Fed. ريج. at 25,32425 (May 7, 2010) (codified in scattered sections of 40 C. F.R. and 49 C. F.R.). 623 Steven D. Cook, Standard on Vehicle Carbon Emissions Announced in EPA Greenhouse Gas Limits . 41 Envt Rep. (BNA) 723, at 723 (Apr. 2, 2010). 624 75 Fed. ريج. at 25,330. 626 Rick Mitchell, New U. S. Vehicle Rules Likely to Cut Demand for Gas Despite Light Truck Bias, IEA Says . 41 Envt Rep. (BNA) 827, at 827 (Apr. 16, 2010). 627 75 Fed. ريج. at 25,330. 628 Peter Menyasz, Environment Canada Proposes Regulations to Limit Vehicles Greenhouse Gas Emissions . 40 Envt Rep. (BNA) 2821, at 2821 (Dec. 11, 2009). 629 David L. Greene amp Andreas Schafer, Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from U. S. Transportation 22 (2003), available at pewclimate. orgdocUploadsustransp. pdf. 630 Id. A National Academy of Sciences study in 2001 concluded that it is possible to obtain a 40 increase in fuel efficiency in light-duty trucks and SUVs at costs that could be recovered over the lifetime of ownership. See Natl Acad. of Scis. Effectiveness and Impact of Corporate Average Fuel Economy (Cafe) Standards 66, 67 tbl. 4-2 (2002). 631 Brent D. Yacobucci amp Robert Bamberger, Cong. Research Serv. RL 33413, Automobile and Light Truck Fuel Economy: The CAFE Standards 4 (2008). 632 Steven D. Cook, Comments on Auto Fuel Economy Rules Argue Case for Backstop on Use of Credits . 40 Envt Rep. (BNA) 2754, at 2754 (Dec. 4, 2009). 633 EPA Vehicle Rule Seeks to Limit GHG Impacts of Greater Electricity Use . 21 Clean Air. Rep. (Inside EPA) Apr. 15, 2010, at 33. 634 See Davis, Diegel amp Boundy, supra note 105, at 3-5 tbl.3.3, 3-8 tbls.3.4.5, 8-2 tbl.8.1 (calculated from data).